Social Identification and Intergroup Behaviour: some emerging issues in the social psychology of intergroup relations.

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<td>Theoretical approaches in the experimental social psychology of intergroup behaviour stress the cognitive rather than affective aspects of group membership. A group is a number of people who perceive themselves to be members of the same social category. Recent experimental work is discussed to argue that this conceptualization is valid in intra- as well as inter-group contexts. The research implications are outlined and several related experiments are proposed to investigate the conditions under which: (i) social categories are internalized when group action succeeds or fails; (ii) social contact and belief-similarity between ingroup and outgroup members improve or worsen intergroup relations; and (iii) social conformity amongst non-interacting category members increases or decreases.</td>
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Social Identification and Intergroup Behaviour:

Some Emerging Issues in the Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations

1. Introductory Preamble

Several experiments on intergroup behaviour are proposed. The experiments are quite diverse. Their unity lies in the fact that they tackle important empirical problems in the social psychology of intergroup relations from a common theoretical perspective. It is necessary, therefore, to outline this perspective before describing the studies themselves.

The ideal procedure would be to relate the experimental social psychology of intergroup behaviour (E.S.P.I.B.) to the fifty years' research into intergroup relations; to trace the development of the E.S.P.I.B. over the last decade, review its major theoretical orientations, pinpoint the major empirical problems and elaborate the general theoretical argument of the proposal within this context. The argument could then be extended in detail to cover the specific research areas intended and the theoretical hypotheses illuminated with copious real-life examples to demonstrate their social relevance. The author has attempted this ideal approach and discovered that, whilst it can be done, it results in a book rather than a research proposal.

Instead, our survey of the E.S.P.I.B. will be cursory; just one problem will be identified to illustrate why some theoretical re-thinking is necessary; the minimum evidence will be presented to justify the re-thinking that has been done; and the social relevance of the research will remain largely implicit.

Kurt Lewin is supposed to have said that there is nothing so practical as a good theory. This would seem especially true in an area such as intergroup relations whose basic phenomena are taken directly from the problems of contemporary society. It is hoped that the theoretical ideas in this proposal are sufficiently distinctive and general that their potentially wide practical value will become clear as the argument develops.

11. The Theoretical Background

1. The experimental social psychology of intergroup behaviour

The E.S.P.I.B. has existed as a coherent research field for no more than a decade. At present experimenters are examining intergroup relations at three main levels: the Interactive, Evaluative, and Cognitive. These equate closely with the dominant theoretical orientations in the field: Realistic - Group - Conflict (R.C.T.), Social Identity (S.I.T.) and Categorization (C.T.) theory.
R.C.T. (Sherif, 1966; Rabbie, 1974) is concerned with the determinants of co-operative and competitive interaction between groups and their effects on intra- and inter-group relations. The main hypotheses are that conflicting group interests create intergroup competition, whereas superordinate or collaborative goals inspire cooperation, and that competition and cooperation lead respectively to intergroup conflict and harmony.

S.I.T. (Tajfel and Turner, in press) focuses on evaluative differences between groups as both the independent and dependent variables for intergroup comparisons. The central hypothesis is that individuals strive for favourable intergroup differences (differentiate the ingroup from the outgroup) in order to evaluate themselves positively in terms of their group membership. An individual's group memberships internalized as aspects of his self-concept are his social identity. It is assumed with C.T. that individuals define themselves in terms of social categories associated subjectively with value-laden characteristics.

C.T. (Tajfel, 1969; Doise, 1976) looks at the cognitive effects of salient, in-group-outgroup categorizations. It proposes that, as category memberships become salient, differences between members of the same category are minimized, whilst those between members of different categories are exaggerated. This is because individuals are assigned all the characteristics perceived to define the category as a whole. A criterial attribute or common category characteristic is any property whose continuous distribution amongst individuals is to some degree correlated with, or predicted by, their discontinuous classification as members of different social groups.

By and large, research provides empirical support for all three theories. They are complementary rather than competitive. R.C.T. and S.I.T. are dynamic, motivational theories (S.I.T. in fact makes both cognitive and motivational assumptions) which explain actual changes in intergroup relations, whereas C.T. is a structural, cognitive theory which explains how existing differences between groups are strengthened through their cognitive accentuation.

S.I.T. possesses the definite advantage that it takes the historical dimension of intergroup relations into account. An important determinant of contemporary intergroup relations is past intergroup relations. The researchers have not only explored the conditions under which social comparisons lead to evaluative differentiations between groups but have also taken "comparative outcomes" (conceptualized as status or prestige differences) as the independent variables for further predictions. Their conclusions as to the relationship between status-stratification between groups and social conflict are summarized in Tajfel and Turner (in press) and Tajfel (in press).

Once intergroup relations are considered from a historical perspective, a very basic problem arises for both R.C.T. and S.I.T. which has, as yet, received no attention. The problem may be stated as follows: why (from a social psychological standpoint) do social groups which mediate defeat, failure, deprivation or subjective inferiority (low status) for their members continue to exist as cohesive social units?

2. The effects of failure, defeat and inferiority on social groups

There can be few real-life social groups which have not at some time been "losers". According to R.C.T. and S.I.T. any competitive struggle results in both objective deprivation and subjective inferiority for the defeated group. R.C.T. contains the Festingerian premise (Festinger, 1950) that the basis of group cohesiveness is goal locomotion and associated similarity of attitudes:
attraction to the group, indeed, the very formation of the group is due to the actual and potential rewards associated with group membership. S.I.T. hypothesizes explicitly that the simplest solution to subjective inferiority is for members to leave the group which provides it - whether physically or psychologically. Thus both theories suggest that groups defeated in competition with an outgroup, that fail in some self-assigned task, should decrease in cohesiveness and perhaps even disintegrate.

There is some experimental data that losing groups do sometimes decrease in cohesiveness, morale and motivation compared to winning groups, but there is also contrary evidence that failure (whether or not linked to defeat by an outgroup) not only does not always decrease cohesiveness but may actually increase it (see Lott and Lott, 1965, for an overview). The anecdotal evidence that failure and defeat sometimes increase cohesiveness and motivation is undeniable. Over two thousand years ago, for example, Julius Caesar at war with the Alexandrians explained their suing for peace with the observation that "they saw that success increased the morale of our men while failure spurred them on, and they knew of no third alternative situation which could give them the superiority in the fighting..." (Caesar, 1967, p.178).

This phenomenon poses a problem not only for "intergroup" theories but also for conventional explanations of group cohesiveness and interpersonal attraction (see Lott and Lott, 1965). Most theorists (e.g., Lott and Lott, 1965; Berscheid and Walster, 1969) suggest that the traditional determinants of interpersonal attraction and group cohesiveness such as social interaction and attitudinal similarity operate through their "rewardingness". Failing groups patently provide their members with losses and not rewards.

A partial explanation is provided by the concept of shared (or outgroup) threat. Shared threat cannot be equated directly with the experience of failure, since the usual assumption is that shared threat increases ingroup cohesiveness by motivating group members to co-operate more closely to avoid failure. If the latter is the case, then clearly such co-operation loses its "raison d'être" once failure becomes a reality.

Lott and Lott (1965), however, point out that if failure is externally rather than internally attributed, if it is perceived to stem from some factor outside of the group, then it is psychologically equivalent to threat. In this case the group has not failed: it has merely received a setback; it faces some external difficulty which can be mastered, not an intrinsic defect in itself which dooms it to perpetual defeat. Thus where failure is externally attributed and so re-interpreted as threat, it will, as shared threat, combine with the hope of eventual success to motivate renewed co-operation and cohesiveness.

Lott and Lott do not explain why some groups accept failure whereas others strive to attribute it externally and so transform it into threat. S.I.T. provides the most persuasive answer. Where individuals' self-concepts are closely bound up with their group membership, the attribution of failure to the group's intrinsic weakness, incompetence or inferiority would damage their self-esteem. Thus group members must attribute failure externally to maintain a positive social identity.

At this point conventional theory has been taken as far as it will go and, yet, we have returned to our initial problem. Why do individuals continue to define their self-concepts in terms of social groups which mediate losses for them? Why, at the point of failure, are the bonds of group membership not loosened so that individuals can protect their self-esteem by re-defining themselves out of the group? Individuals are supposed to be bound to a group by its cohesiveness and cohesiveness is supposed to be based on
the various rewards associated with group membership. The explanation of how failure can increase cohesiveness is completely circular unless we can find something other than cohesiveness which binds individuals' self-concepts to their group membership. This is the task we shall attempt in the research section of the proposal. Firstly, however, we must discuss more generally the nature of social groups.

3. The cognitive basis of group membership

Experimental social psychology has long viewed the social group as a small ad-hoc unit whose members are in face-to-face relations of interaction, attraction and influence. The essence of "groupiness" is cohesiveness. As the word implies, it is that social psychological property which binds individuals together, which makes them "cohere" as a social unit. Lott and Lott's (1965) authoritative review makes clear that the concept represents a theory of the social group. The kernel of the theory is that social groups are based on interpersonal attraction or liking. Attraction to the group has, in practice, been operationalized as attraction to the individuals in the group. Thus, according to the theory, social groups are units of social cohesion; social cohesion equates with interpersonal attraction, and the main criterion for group formation is the affective component of inter-member attitudes: that individuals like each other.

This has been a very productive model for investigating intra-group dynamics, but has always been inadequate for research into intergroup relations. The subject matter of intergroup relations is the relations between members of large-scale social categories (such as national, class, racial, religious or occupational groupings), not small, face-to-face groups. S.I.T. and C.T., for example, both emphasize the cognitive rather than affiliative-interactive aspects of group membership. A social group is defined as a number of people who perceive themselves to be members of the same social category, who share a common identification of themselves as belonging to a distinct category. Groups are based on Social Identification, not Social Cohesion. From this perspective, the primary criterion for group formation is not affective, but cognitive: individuals do not have to like each other, they must perceive themselves to be joined in common category membership.

There is now experimental evidence that the Social Identification model has greater validity as a theory of "groupiness" in both intra- and intergroup contexts. We shall concentrate on the intra-group context since it is here that the traditional model should be most applicable.

Firstly, let us consider the antecedents of group membership. The relevant studies are few, but persuasive. They suggest that social cohesion is neither necessary nor sufficient for group formation, whereas social identification seems to be both necessary and sufficient. The studies have looked at interpersonal attraction and/or social category memberships as independent variables for group formation, as measured by the appearance of ingroup-outgroup biases in evaluation or behaviour or by intra-group altruism. Interpersonal attraction per se is never manipulated; it is always operationalized by means of some variable such as similarity in beliefs and preferences or co-operative interaction which research has reliably demonstrated to increase liking between individuals.

Two studies by Billig (Billig and Tajfel, 1973; Billig, 1973) illustrate that interpersonal similarity between ingroup members is not necessary for intergroup discrimination. Subjects were assigned to one of two minimal social categories on an explicitly random basis. There was no reason in the experimental situation for individuals to like members of their own category more than members of the other. Yet subjects discriminated in favour of their
randomly allocated, minimal ingroup over the outgroup.

Other experiments demonstrate that interpersonal similarities per se are not sufficient for ingroup formation in that subjects do not favour similar others over dissimilar others (Deutsch et. al, 1971; Chase, 1971; Turner, in press). Some studies have manipulated social category memberships (ingroup vs. outgroup) and interpersonal similarity (similar vs. dissimilar others) orthogonally to each other in a 2 x 2 factorial design (Billig and Tajfel, 1973; Allen and Wilder, 1975). They find that only the former variable predicts ingroup formation. Subjects favour members of the same category, whether or not they are similar to themselves and even when they are less similar than members of the other category. In both studies subjects favour similar significantly more than dissimilar others only if the similar others are members of the same category as the subjects.

Dion (1973) and Kennedy and Stephan (1977) sought to increase ingroup cohesiveness to produce intergroup discrimination. They manipulated cohesiveness by similarity and successful co-operation between individuals respectively. There was some evidence that these variables increased interpersonal attraction but none that they promoted favouritism towards the ingroup over the outgroup. Since the conditions of these studies were such that ingroup formation should have led to intergroup biases, we may conclude that cohesiveness did not lead to ingroup formation.

Three naturalistic field experiments are especially noteworthy. Sole et. al (1973) hypothesized that altruistic helping behaviour is mediated by common category membership. They manipulated the degree of opinion-similarity (on both important and unimportant issues) between subjects and a stranger (who needed help). With important issues, attraction to the stranger increased proportionately with his similarity, but helping increased only with 100% similarity. When only unimportant similarities were involved, helping increased with similarity, but attraction did not. They conclude that attraction does not predict helping (in this situation); opinion-similarity is important insofar as it allows the subject to classify the stranger unambiguously as a member of the "we-group", not insofar as it increases attraction.

There seem to be at least three ways in which interpersonal attraction may be related to, but is neither necessary nor sufficient for, group formation. Firstly, as in Sole's experiments, variables which are usually assumed to increase attraction can often function independently as cognitive criteria for category formation. Variables leading to group formation which almost certainly function in this way are total or extreme similarities between people (Sole et. al, 1973; Hensley and Duval, 1976; Moghaddam, 1977), common fate, (Rabbie and Horwitz, 1969) and shared threat (Feshbach and Singer, 1957; Burnstein and McRae, 1962).

Secondly, there is plenty of evidence that variables which should increase attraction do strengthen attachment to the ingroup once a common category membership has already been established. This has been found with social or verbal interaction (Rabbie and Wilkens, 1971; Stephenson et. al, 1976; Janssens and Nuttin, 1976), "collective encounter" (Doise and Sinclair, 1973), and opinion-similarity (Billig and Tajfel, 1973; Allen and Wilder, 1975; Moghaddam, 1977). It is not clear whether these effects are produced by increases in the cognitive salience of group membership, interpersonal attraction, or both.

Thirdly, social cohesion may arise as a direct product of social identification. We may not join those we like so much as like those we perceive ourselves joined to. This is explicable in terms of C.T. We infer the common characteristics of our category from its individual exemplars including ourselves, and then assign them to all category members, again including ourselves. Thus perceived intra-group similarity is created or enhanced as a function of
intra-group or self-stereotyping processes. Intra-group liking would arise from the perceived stereotypic similarity of ingroup members rather than from idiosyncratic personal similarities. (Face-to-face interaction, therefore, could sometimes decrease social cohesion by providing information which disconfirmed stereotypic similarity). This idea has never been looked at directly, but some data tend to support it (e.g., Allen and Wilder, 1975, p.972; Hensley and Duval, 1976; Stephan, 1977; Turner, in press).

In toto, the above studies suggest that the crucial factor in group formation is social identification and not social cohesion.

4. Psychological depersonalization within groups

In the above section, it was hypothesized that social cohesion within groups may arise as a consequence of the cognitive processes associated with social identifications. We use the individual exemplars of a category to infer its common criterial characteristics and then assign those characteristics to all members as category membership becomes salient. This represents the inductive and deductive aspects of the categorization or stereotyping process (cf. Tajfel, 1969, 1972) applied to ingroup members. It is well recognized that stereotyping leads to the perceptual homogenization and depersonalization of outgroup members: such individuals become perceptually interchangeable since they are perceived in terms of their shared category attributes instead of their personal idiosyncratic qualities. Several distinctively intra-group phenomena display the same property of depersonalization. The implication is that much intra-group behaviour is based on processes of self-stereotyping and hence that group membership has a strong cognitive component.

Some of the characteristic consequences of common group membership are (1) perceived similarity; (2) inter-member attraction; (3) mutual regard or esteem; (4) altruism; (5) emotional empathy or contagion; and (6) attitudinal and behavioural uniformity. Moreover, there is evidence that, as category membership is made salient, (1) perceived intra-group similarity and intra-group liking are enhanced (Hensley and Duval, 1976; Turner, in press); (2) self and others are evaluated favourably in terms of common group membership even when own and other's individual performance was detrimental to the group outcome (Myers, 1962; Kalin and Marlowe, 1968; Kahn and Ryen, 1972); (3) others' goals and needs become motives for one's own behaviour (Horwitz, 1953; Hornstein, 1972; Sole et. al, 1973); and (4) conformity to group norms increases without direct social influence from others (Charters and Newcomb, 1952; Doise, 1969; Skinner and Stephenson, 1976; White, 1977).

The above papers are cited because they focus more or less on the cognitive salience of group membership as their independent variable and because they report data which is inexplicable in terms of interpersonal relations operating within groups. It appears that the characteristics, performances, needs, experiences and behaviours of other category members may influence our long-term or momentary stereotype of the category as a whole and thus be assigned to all category members including oneself. We paint ourselves with a brush dipped in the colours of others and vice versa and these colours may range from opinions and traits to motives and emotions.

The author is aware of no evidence relating directly to emotional empathy and contagion, although the role of cognitive factors in emotional states is now well-recognized (cf. Schachter and Singer, 1962). An anecdotal example might be some racial incident where one black person is assaulted physically by one white. The result might be (and often is) that the black community as a whole seethes with anger and seeks revenge on all available whites. In other words, each black person reacts emotionally as if he or his nearest and dearest had been attacked. Each person assigns to himself the experience of his social category, which, in turn, he infers from the experience of one
representative exemplar. We need assume no friendship or acquaintance between
the victim and other blacks for empathy and contagion to occur, nor any group
pressure for emotional conformity. We need assume only that individuals act on
the basis of their shared self-stereotype as circumstances make their category
membership salient or relevant.

Stereotyping normally refers to the perceptual or cognitive effects of
salient, social identifications in relation to outgroup members (cf. Tajfel,
1969). To explain certain forms of depersonalization with groups our suggestion
is that stereotyping is as applicable to ingroups as outgroups (e.g., Stephan,
1977); that stereotypic characteristics may include evaluative performances,
needs and goals, emotions and attitudinal and behavioural norms as well as the
well-studied personality or behavioural traits; and that the inductive and de-
ductive aspects of the categorization process may operate in a rapid and trans-
itory manner as well as in a slow and highly stable fashion.

Much of this section has been speculative. However, our speculation has
involved the application of a well-researched process (e.g., Ehrlich, 1973) to
a body of hard data which the author would contend it is difficult to explain
in any other way. The purpose has been indirect: if self-stereotyping explains
certain forms of intra-group behaviour, the hypothesis is reinforced that, from
a social psychological perspective, social groups are shared social identifica-
tions.

5. The theoretical conclusion

Evidence concerning both the antecedents and consequences of group mem-
bership suggests that groups are individuals bound by cognitive and not affective
relations. Groups are based on shared social identifications and not cohesiveness.
A social identification is basically a shared self-stereotype in terms
of some category. This notion argues that the distinctive property of intra-
and inter-group behaviour is psychological depersonalization. Under conditions
where social identifications are salient, individuals will form their self-
attitudes and act towards others on the basis of their shared category charact-
eristics and not on the basis of their idiosyncratic interpersonal similarities
and differences (cf. Tajfel, 1974). Depersonalization, it should be pointed
out, need not imply dehumanization (as it sometimes does in relation to hated
outgroups); it is as relevant to altruism and empathy as cruelty and indiffer-
ence.

III. Research Implications, Hypotheses and Experimental Paradigms

1. General direction for research

The above discussion has three major implications for research into inter-
group relations. Firstly, to understand how social groups are formed, we need
to shift our emphasis from the problem of why individuals like each other to
exploring how social categories are formed and internalized as aspects of in-
dividuals' self-concepts.

Secondly, to understand behavioural uniformity amongst members of large-
scale social categories (e.g., national, class, ethnic, etc.) we should recog-
nize that social influence is not always exerted in a direct face-to-face
manner. The cognitive processes associated with self-stereotyping activity
allow us to postulate a form of social influence which is distinct from both
normative and informational influence as usually understood. Referent Inform-
ational Influence, as we shall call it, leads to conformity behaviour which is
dependent on neither 'group pressure' (normative influence) nor social compar-
isons between own and another's behaviour in the immediate social situation
(informational influence).
Thirdly, to find the effective determinants of intergroup conflict and harmony, we must draw a sharp distinction between interpersonal on the one hand and intra- and inter-group relations on the other. The distinction between interpersonal and group behaviour is precisely that the latter is "de-personalized". It is based on the shared attributions to self and others of the common characteristics of their category memberships, not on the distinctive idiosyncratic features of individual persons. We need to abandon the powerful myth (expressed in, for example, the Belief-Similarity and Social Contact theories of reducing prejudice) that variables which increase attraction between individuals will have the same or any effects when the different category memberships of those individuals become salient. Inter-individual interaction reflects intergroup and not interpersonal relations when category memberships are sufficiently salient.

These implications will now be made more specific through concrete hypotheses and experimental paradigms relevant to each area.

2. Group formation under conditions of success and failure

In this section we return to the problem posed at the outset: why do groups which fail sometimes become more cohesive? We hypothesize that two sets of processes underlie the internalization of social categories, social influence and attitude change on the basis of overt behaviour.

By social influence, we mean simply (following, for example, Kelman, 1958) that credible and/or attractive communicators can persuade us to adopt a certain social definition of ourselves. In the case of an attractive source this does not imply we form a group with the communicator - it indicates that, within reason, liked others (e.g., parents) can persuade us to see ourselves in any number of ways.

By attitude change, we refer to findings from the "Forced Compliance Paradigm" (cf. Harvey and Smith, 1977, pp.219-227) that we tend to bring our private attitudes in line with our public behaviour. It has been shown, too, that attitude change is sometimes negatively related to the incentives or rewards for public behaviour, i.e., the less the rewards for performing an attitudinally discrepant behaviour, the greater the tendency to change private attitudes towards justifying the behaviour. There is reasonable consensus at present that both Dissonance (or Attribution) and Incentive effects can be obtained in the forced-compliance paradigm: sometimes attitudes change more with fewer incentives, and sometimes less. One variable which determines whether dissonance or incentive effects occur is the person's Freedom in choosing to perform the public behaviour. It is this research area, we would suggest, which provides a first answer to our initial problem. Our hypotheses are as follows:

H.1 Under appropriate conditions, social groups may be formed through the changing of self-attitudes on the basis of overt behaviour. Social action, however induced, on the basis of a social category membership may lead to the internalization of that category membership.

H.1a Where individuals freely commit themselves to behaviour on the basis of a social category, consequent identification with that category (and hence group cohesiveness) will be greater under conditions of group failure (fewer rewards) than group success (more rewards).
H.1b Where individuals are forced to act on the basis of a social category, consequent identification (and hence group cohesiveness) with that category will be greater under conditions of group success than group failure. Thus, under certain conditions, individuals must define themselves more strongly in terms of a social category to justify the losses they have incurred. At the same time, this brings the risk of decreased self-esteem, hence they must attribute failure externally. External attribution of failure and increased cohesiveness are merely symptoms, in this account, of the increased identification which failure can create. Doubtless, this is not a complete answer, but it is a beginning.

To test these hypotheses a 2 x 2 experimental design is proposed. The independent variables would be Free versus Forced Group Membership and Success versus Failure. The dependent variables would include measures of ingroup identification, cohesiveness, ingroup-outgroup attitudes and internal versus external attributions of success and failure.

The procedure would involve a modification of the minimal group paradigm (Turner, in press). Subjects would be assigned on an explicitly random basis to one of two minimal social categories. Group members would then perform individually some simple task, but the performance of each group would be evaluated as a whole. In each session, one group would succeed and one fail on the task (Success versus Failure conditions). In half the sessions, the experimenter, through instructions, would carefully induce the impression amongst Ss that they had freely accepted their category membership and chosen to contribute to its performance; in the other sessions, the Ss would perceive that they had been forced into their group membership and group activity (Free versus Forced group membership conditions).

The prediction would be that attachment to the ingroup would be greater in the Free:Failure and Forced:Success than Free:Success and Forced:Failure conditions.

It should be relatively easy to operationalize this paradigm with some initial piloting. Furthermore, it could be varied in simple ways to test related hypotheses. For example, later experiments could vary the interdependence of ingroup and outgroup task performance to explore the conditions under which ingroup failure is externally attributed to (blamed on) the outgroup.

3. The reduction of intergroup tension

This section would aim to demonstrate concretely the distinction between interpersonal and group behaviour. Specifically, experiments are proposed to test the hypothesis that the effects of belief-similarity and social contact on interpersonal relations cannot be extrapolated directly to intergroup relations. This sounds negative, but as will be seen, the experiments should contain positive pointers to the conditions under which intergroup tension can be reduced.

The basic idea of the belief-similarity and social contact hypotheses (and other interpersonal theories) is that, for example, friendly interaction between ingroup and outgroup members leads to the breaking down of group boundaries, the abandonment of derogatory mutual stereotypes and the discovery of common values and beliefs. Thus ingroup and outgroup members should come to like each other as they like fellow ingroup members.
Our objection to this position is straightforward. The more that friendly interaction between, for instance, a black and a white person takes place on an interpersonal basis, the less capacity it will have for modifying actual intergroup relations, and the less their friendship will predict their behaviour towards each other once their black-white category memberships become sufficiently salient. The statement: "one of my best friends is a black/Jew etc." is now a cliché for racial prejudice. Similarly it is a cliché theme of Civil War novels and films that salient different group memberships can tear apart the closest of friends and families.

Furthermore, the same variable, such as belief-similarity, which predicts attraction between members of the same group, may have opposite effects when two individuals identify themselves as members of different groups. Once different category memberships are salient, the effects of a variable can only be predicted in the context of the relations between the categories. For instance, both R.C.T. and S.I.T. predict that similarity of attitudes between groups can sometimes increase competition between them - this should presumably decrease attraction between ingroup and outgroup members.

Our argument, then, is that belief-similarity and social contact between an ingroup and outgroup member will influence intergroup relations, not to the degree that intergroup stereotypes are not employed, but only to the extent that these variables modify those stereotypes, and that the nature of their influence will depend on existing intergroup relations.

The hypotheses are as follows:

H.2 Social contact between ingroup and outgroup members will modify intergroup attitudes where ingroup and outgroup members interact, psychologically, as group representatives, but will have no effect on intergroup attitudes where ingroup and outgroup members interact on an interpersonal basis.

H2a Where ingroup and outgroup members interact as group representatives, friendly or unfriendly behaviour by the outgroup member will improve or worsen respectively the ingroup's attitudes towards the outgroup as a whole.

H2b Where ingroup and outgroup members interact on an interpersonal basis (i.e. not as group representatives), friendly or unfriendly behaviour by the outgroup member will not affect the ingroup's attitude towards the outgroup as a whole.

H3 Similarity of attitudes and beliefs between ingroup and outgroup members will improve or worsen intergroup attitudes according to the nature of the existing intergroup relationship.

H3a Under conditions of intergroup competition, belief-similarity will decrease liking between ingroup and outgroup.

H3b Under conditions of intergroup co-operation, belief-similarity will increase liking between ingroup and outgroup.

To test hypotheses 2a and 2b a 2 x 2 experimental design is proposed. The independent variables would be the Friendship versus Enmity of one outgroup member towards one ingroup member, and whether the ingroup and outgroup members interact as Group Representatives or not (Representative versus Non-Representative). The dependent variables would be measures of attitudes towards ingroup and outgroup interactors, ingroup and outgroup as a whole, and estimates of ingroup and outgroup competitiveness in a mixed-motive game.
Proposed Investigation (cont'd)

Ss in each session would be assigned to an ingroup which believes it is to play a mixed-motive game with an outgroup waiting in another room. One member of the ingroup will meet one outgroup member, prior to the game, for a discussion which he will then report back to the ingroup. The outgroup member will be a confederate of the experimenter, briefed to behave in either a friendly or unfriendly way. Both before and after the ingroup member's report of his discussion with the outgroup member, Ss will complete the main dependent measures. In half the conditions, the group interactors will be selected to function as group representatives (by the experimenter). In the other conditions, the interactors will be selected explicitly by chance and the experimenter will stress that they are not acting as representatives.

The prediction is that attitudes towards the outgroup as a whole will be improved or worsened by the outgroup interactor's behaviour in the Representative conditions, but will be neither improved nor worsened in the Non-Representative conditions.

To test hypotheses 2a and 2b, the experimental paradigm would involve manipulating Co-operation versus Competition between two groups and their discovery that they have Similar versus Dissimilar task-relevant attitudes halfway through their co-operative or competitive task activity. The dependent variables would be measures of task-relevant attitudes, intergroup attitudes and estimates of relative ingroup-outgroup performance on the task.

Subjects would be divided into two groups and have a simple discussion task described to them. Then they would complete questionnaires about their task-relevant attitudes. Initially, the groups would work on identical tasks in the same room under either co-operative or competitive instructions. Halfway through their discussions, they would be taken to separate rooms to continue their work in private and also to hear that both groups have either similar or dissimilar task-relevant attitudes. Once their tasks were finished, the dependent measures would be administered.

The prediction would be that belief-similarity increases liking between co-operative groups but decreases liking between competitive groups.

The experimental paradigms described in this section are both relatively easy to operationalize. There are no obvious conceptual or methodological problems which initial piloting should not be able to overcome.

4. Cognitive processes in social influence

The experiments proposed in this section are perhaps the most ambitious theoretically and difficult methodologically, although they will make use of the well-known Asch Conformity Paradigm (cf. Harvey and Smith, 1977, p.241). Our hypothesis is that the cognitive processes associated with self-stereotyping activity give rise to a distinct form of social influence which we shall call Referent Informational. (This term has been carefully chosen for theoretical reasons, which need not be outlined here).

Referent Informational Influence (R.I.I.), we suggest, is especially important for understanding behavioural and attitudinal uniformity amongst members of large-scale social categories. It takes place in three stages:

(i) the individual defines himself as a member of a distinct social category;

(ii) the individual forms or learns the stereotypic norms of that category. He ascertains that certain ways of behaving are common criterial attributes of category membership. Certain appropriate, expected or desirable
behaviours are used to define the category as different from other categories;

(iii) the individual assigns these norms to himself in the same way that he assigns other stereotypic characteristics of the category to himself when his category membership becomes psychologically salient. Thus his behaviour becomes more normative (conformist) as his category membership becomes salient.

Evidence has already been mentioned that the cognitive salience of one's category membership increases conformity to category norms without direct interpersonal influence. It will be useful to outline very briefly how R.I.I. differs from Normative (N.I.) and Informational Influence (I.I.) as usually understood:

(i) Who is one influenced by?
N.I.: people with power to reward conformity and punish deviation (usually attractive others).
I.I.: similar people who provide information about physical or social reality.
R.I.I.: people who provide information about the criterial norms of one's social category. These will usually be common category members (who need not be attractive or similar), but in some instances where ingroup members are not available, they may be persuasive outgroup members (e.g., the mass media, school, etc.).

(ii) What is the vehicle of social influence?
N.I.: social communication from group members or "group pressure".
I.I.: social comparisons with group members.
R.I.I.: social identification - the processes by which one defines oneself as a category member - forms a group stereotype on the basis of other category members' behaviour, and applies the stereotype to oneself. Interpersonal communication and comparison may be important for elaborating the stereotype, but they are not the vehicle of influence, since they are not necessary for increased conformity.

(iii) Under what conditions does conformity increase?
N.I.: when one's behaviour is under surveillance by fellow group members.
I.I.: when physical or social reality is ambiguous, complex or problematic in some way.
R.I.I.: when one's group membership (self-definition as a group member) is salient.

(iv) What does one conform to?
N.I.: the observable behaviour of other group members.
I.I.: ditto.
R.I.I.: one's own beliefs about the appropriate behaviour for all category members (the cognitive aspects of one's attitudes towards the ingroup, i.e., one's stereotype of the ingroup). Own behaviour may become more normative at the same time as it differs from the observable behaviour of other group members.
There is good reason to suppose that R.I.I. operates in the Asch Conformity Paradigm. We base ourselves here on Moscovici and Faucheux's (1972) analysis as discussed by Harvey and Smith (1977, pp. 240-247). The Asch paradigm, in which naive subjects conform to an obviously incorrect majority (confederates of the experimenter) in about 30% of their responses, was designed to exclude I.I. The physical reality (lengths of lines) which Ss are judging is not ambiguous. The subject does not conform to be correct about physical reality - most subjects know the majority are wrong. Thus Asch conformity is usually presumed to indicate N.I. - the subject conforms to avoid rejection by the majority and win their approbation. Anonymity is supposed to eliminate N.I. If the majority do not know who is conforming or deviating, they cannot approve the conformist or reject the deviant. Anonymously responding subjects do conform less, but not much less. Approximately 25% of responses remain conformist. As Harvey and Smith point out, most of the initial conformity remains in a situation from which, by and large, the traditional processes of social influence have been eliminated.

Moscovici and Faucheux's solution is to hypothesize that subjects use the majority's behaviour as information about the unique "response-rule" of the group, not as information about physical reality. The majority's incorrect responses inform the subject as to the distinctive norms of the group to which he now belongs. This is evidently similar to the notion of R.I.I.. In our terminology, the naive subject defines himself as a member of the experimental subject group (himself and the majority): the unanimous behaviour of the majority informs him about the strange but indisputable norm of this group: since this group membership is both salient and relevant to his behaviour in this situation, he conforms to his beliefs about appropriate behaviour for members of this group. The subject is not concerned about being right in the abstract, nor about the others' reactions: he wants to do the right thing as a member of this group in this situation.

Our hypotheses about R.I.I. will be formulated with specific reference to the Asch Conformity Paradigm:

H.4 The greater part of Asch conformity reflects Referent Informational Influence. Such conformity depends on the subject's perception that he is a member of the same social category as the majority and that the majority's behaviour represents the criterial norm of that category.

H.4a Where the subject and the unanimous incorrect majority belong to different social categories, conformity to the majority will decrease as category memberships are made salient.

H.4b Where the subject and the incorrect majority belong to the same social category, one correct ingroup responder (supporter) will decrease the subject's conformity to the majority as category membership is made salient.

H.4c Where the subject and the incorrect majority belong to the same social category, one correct outgroup responder (supporter) will not decrease the subject's conformity to the majority as category memberships are made salient.

If the subject and the majority belong to different groups, the majority's responses provide him with no information about the norms of his own group. Hence he will not conform. If category memberships are not salient, the subject may tend to form a new group with the majority and so continue to conform.

If the subject, majority and one supporter (a confederate who makes correct responses) all belong to the same group, the supporter provides information that
incorrect responding is not a group norm. Where common group membership is not salient, the subject may tend to exclude the supporter from the ingroup and continue to conform.

On the other hand, if the subject and majority belong to one group, but the supporter belongs to another, the responses of the majority and not the supporter indicate the ingroup norms. Thus the supporter will not decrease conformity. Again, this effect will be weakened if the category memberships are not salient.

Two experiments are proposed. They both make use of two paradigms which are sufficiently well-established that they need not be described: the Minimal Group (cf. Turner, in press) and Asch Conformity Paradigms.

Experiment 1: there will be five conditions. The Control condition will be the classical Asch procedure with one naive subject and a unanimous incorrect majority (of experimental confederates) to establish the base line level of conformity. In the experimental conditions, all Ss will be assigned on an explicitly random basis to one of two minimal social categories. They will then take part in the Asch task. In half the conditions, the subject and the majority will be aware that they belong to the same category; in the others, subject and majority will belong to different categories. (Same versus Different-Category). In half of these conditions, the experimenter will place no stress on group memberships; in the others, he will instruct everybody to act as group representatives (Non-salient versus Salient Categories).

It is predicted that conformity will increase in the order: Control < Non-Salient; Same Category < Salient; Same Category conditions, and decrease in the order: Control > Non-Salient; Different Category > Salient; Different Category conditions.

Experiment 2: there will be five conditions. The control condition will be the classical Asch procedure where one subject faces an incorrect majority with one correct supporter. The experimental subjects will again be assigned to minimal categories prior to taking part in the Asch task. They will face an incorrect majority with one correct supporter. The independent variables will be whether the supporter is in the Same or a Different Category as the subject and majority (who will always be in the same group) and whether Category memberships are Salient or Non-Salient (operationalized as in Experiment 1).

It is predicted that conformity will decrease in the order: Control > Non-Salient; Same Category > Salient; Same Category, and increase in the order: Control < Non-Salient; Different Category < Salient; Different Category conditions.

These studies should demonstrate that most Asch conformity does not depend on face-to-face pressure or support but on the subject's social identifications with others in the situation.

IV Overview and Conclusion

The intention is to conduct and write up at least six major studies (exclusive of piloting) over the three years. This is a heavy workload, but should be possible since all the studies are conceptually simple and involve either well-established or variants of well-established methodologies. Their
originality and value lies in the ideas behind them—which frequently bridge important areas of social psychological theory. Furthermore, the hypotheses are easily extrapolated to real-life settings and in this sense undoubtedly possess real-world relevance and practical value.

Time and effort will be primarily consumed in procuring subjects, preparing materials, piloting, running experimental sessions, analysing data and writing reports. For this reason, at least two full-time research assistants are required if the full series of studies is to be completed. (Similarly, some occasional typing assistance will be required). The aim would be to employ two recent psychology graduates with intentions to pursue Ph.Ds in related areas of social psychology.

It would be extremely useful to visit at some stage (probably at the end of the second year) one of the two centres of experimental research into intergroup behaviour (apart from Bristol itself) in Europe. These are Utrecht University (J. Rabbie) and Geneva University (W. Doise). Both are conducting related research and an exchange of ideas would be mutually advantageous. It is difficult to choose between the two now, and the decision will probably depend on various circumstances at the time, such as mutual convenience.

The studies will be conducted in the order in which they have been described at the rate of approximately two studies per year. The most time-consuming experiments, the Conformity studies, will be left to the last year. At this point, it will be possible to review the progress made, estimate the time necessary to write the final report and make a decision about whether one or both of these studies can be attempted.
REFERENCES


Proposed Investigation (cont'd)


