SOCIAL IDENTITY, SOCIAL CategorIZATION AND SOCIAL COMPARISON IN INTErGROUP BEHAVIOUR.

I. The theoretical and research background

The present research proposal is not based on a theory which is firmly and finally articulated; it is not, however, an entirely new research departure. For some three or four years there has been an interlocking development, in Bristol and elsewhere, of experimental studies and theoretical ideas related to them, many of which were definitely post hoc. The aim of this proposal is to enable us to continue this process with the hope that, at the end of the project, we shall have a more solid basis for a respectable theory.

Social psychology of intergroup relations has not fared too well in the last thirty years or so. Characteristically, in their chapter on "Group processes" in the Annual Review of Psychology, Gerard and Miller (1967) devoted to it a dozen lines or so in a text of about 40 pages. The impact of these few lines is: (a) that indeed very little experimental work on intergroup processes is being done; and (b) that this is due to the methodological difficulties of creating intergroup situations in the laboratory.

The major trends can be briefly characterized as follows: developments from various versions of the frustration-aggression hypothesis well represented, for example, by the work of Berkowitz (e.g. 1962, 1965); and the quasi-experimental studies of groups in conflict deriving from the work of Sherif (e.g. 1966). In addition, there have been some isolated studies about the evaluation of ingroups and outgroups (e.g. Bass & Duntemann, 1963; Doise, 1969; Ferguson & Kelley, 1964; Peabody, 1968; Rabbie & Horwitz, 1969; Rabbie & Wilkens, 1971; Wilson & Katayani, 1968; Wilson & Miller, 1960) which together, however, did not amount to a clear-cut theoretical advance in the field. The rich tradition of the work on prejudice initiated soon after the war in the United States (Adorno et al. 1950) was mainly, if not exclusively, focused on the genesis of hostile and discriminatory attitudes and behaviour; the same is true of the work on stereotypes and other cognitive aspects of prejudice, although there have been some attempts to relate this work to more
general aspects of cognitive functioning (e.g. Allport, 1954; Campbell, 1967; Tajfel, 1959; Tajfel, 1969a).

Independently of the detail of the various approaches to the psychology of intergroup relations, one general statement about them can be made which does not (as it appears to the present writer) do them injustice. They focused on intergroup processes taking as their point of departure attitudes and behaviour towards the outgroups. In some cases, as in the work on frustration and aggression, these outgroup attitudes and behaviour were seen as an instance of a more general law of human motivation, in some sense preliminary to any social context (cf. Tajfel, 1972a). In others, such as the work of Sherif, the emphasis has been on the development of outgroup attitudes, and almost epiphenomenally, of ingroup affiliations. Both the ingroup and outgroup attitudes were seen as a result of emerging social norms, directly due to an explicit intergroup conflict of goals. This conflict was not only clearly explicit to the subjects; it was also clearly defined as such by the experimenters; the creation of it and the study of its results were the aims of the research.

Much of the argument to follow can be said to be based on a simple statement: in order for the members of an ingroup to be able to hate or dislike an outgroup, or to discriminate against it, they must first have acquired a sense of belonging to a group which is clearly distinct from the one they hate, dislike, or discriminate against. Much of the tradition in the literature (not only in social psychology) ascribes the acquisition of this sense of belonging to the existence of outgroups perceived as threats, common enemies, etc. A weaker proposition in the same tradition is that the existence of such outgroups at least contributes to, or increases, the intensity of ingroup affiliations. The existence or strength of the ingroup are thus seen as phenomena derived from the relations between the ingroup and its outgroups. In some cases, this consists of presumed intragroup effects of various kinds of direct or projected outgroup hostility; in others, it is seen as a direct result of an "objective" conflict of interests between the groups. The emphasis remains the same.

There is no doubt that this outgroup–ingroup sequence of attitudes and behaviour has a great deal of validity, both intuitively and as a result of a great mass of empirical evidence. But the emphasis–understandable as it has
been, mainly for social reasons - is too one-sided. An adequate social psychological theory of intergroup behaviour must take into account both causal directions: from ingroup processes to outgroup behaviour and attitudes as well as the opposite one which has been until now the principal object of theory and research. Even if it is true that originally many groups are created as a common shelter for their members from outside threats and dangers (human or not), it is equally true that in any complex society an individual confronts from the beginning of his life a complex network of groupings which presents him with a network of relationships into which he must fit himself. One of the most important and durable problems that is posed to an individual by his insertion into society is to find, create and define his place in these networks. It is reasonable to assume that both his ingroup and outgroup attitudes and behaviour must be determined, to some extent at least, by this continuing process of self-definition.

An early version of these ideas led to the first experiments we conducted in Bristol some three or four years ago (Tajfel, 1970a; Tajfel et al., 1971). Their aim was to establish minimal conditions in which an individual will, in his behaviour, distinguish between an ingroup and an outgroup. In order to create such minimal conditions we attempted to eliminate from the experimental situations all the variables that normally lead to ingroup favouritism or discrimination against the outgroup: face-to-face interaction; conflict of interests; any possibility of previous hostility; any "utilitarian" or instrumental link between the subjects' responses and their self-interest. In addition, we enabled the subjects to choose amongst a variety of strategies in their responses, some of which were more "rational" or "useful" than creating a differentiation between the groups. The subjects first performed a relatively trivial task (guessing numbers of dots in rapidly projected clusters, or expressing preference for the paintings of one of two fairly abstract painters, Klee and Kandinsky). They then worked separately in individual cubicles. Their task was to decide (on a number of payment matrices) about division of points worth money between two other subjects. They knew what was their own group membership (under- or over-estimation of dots; or preference for one or the other painter), and the group membership of those between whom
they were dividing the money; but those others were designated by code numbers, and their identity was unknown. The results were very highly significant in the direction of awarding more money to members of the "ingroup". In the second set of experiments, the matrices were so constructed that we could assess the separate "pull" of several variables on the decisions. These variables were: maximum joint profit (i.e., the strategy of awarding the maximum joint amount on each matrix, so that all the subjects together—who knew each other well before the experiments—could get the greatest possible amount of money out of the experimenter); maximum profit for members of the ingroup; maximum difference in favour of the ingroup at the price of sacrificing both the above advantages; and fairness of choices. Of these variables, the first—maximum joint profit—exerted hardly any pull on the decisions; maximum ingroup profit was important, but sometimes not nearly as important as achieving maximum difference in favour of the ingroup. Fairness was also a significant variable and served to moderate the excesses of ingroup favouritism.

Two simple and overlapping explanations are available to account for these results: a "normative" one and a "learning" one. The first is that our schoolboy subjects, aged 15 to 16 years, saw the situation as one of "team competition" in which one should make one's own team win at whatever cost. The second, that—in a new situation—they engaged in ingroup behaviour which had been reinforced on countless occasions in the past. Both these explanations are sensible; they are also quite "uninteresting"—uninteresting because not genuinely heuristic. If our subjects had chosen strategies of choices leading to maximum joint profit, the same explanations could still serve, in one form or another. If they had chosen only the strategy of fairness without that of ingroup favouritism, one could still "explain" their responses starting from norms and previous reinforcements. My argument is not that these explanations are invalid. It is rather that, in addition to their capacity to explain indiscriminately all kinds of results, they are at a level of generality which prevents them from serving as a point of departure for new and more searching insights about intergroup processes.
It is the choice by the subjects of these particular norms based on these particular reinforcements which defines the problem and provides a departure for some research questions about the psychology of intergroup relations. This is particularly so in view of the fact that the results have since been replicated in several experiments both in Britain (Billig, 1972; Billig & Tajfel, 1973; Tajfel & Billig, 1973; Turner, 1973b) and elsewhere (Deutsch et al., 1971; Doise, et al., 1972; Sole et al., 1973).

The problems of an individual’s self-definition in a social context, briefly mentioned above, can be restated in terms of the notion of social identity. We need to postulate that, at least in our kinds of societies, an individual strives to achieve a satisfactory concept or image of himself. This was one of the bases of Festinger’s theory of social comparison (1954). Festinger, however, was almost exclusively concerned with social comparisons made between individuals and with evaluations of oneself and others made by means of these inter-individual comparisons. This inter-individual emphasis neglects an important contributing aspect of an individual’s self-definition: the fact that he is a member of numerous social groups and that this membership contributes, positively or negatively, to the image that he has of himself.

Four linked concepts will be employed in order to proceed with this discussion. They are: social categorization, social identity, social comparison and psychological distinctiveness.

The process of categorization, as it is used by the human individual in order to systematize and simplify his environment, presents certain theoretical continuities from the role played by categorizing in perceptual activities to its role in the ordering of one’s social environment. For our purpose, social categorization can be understood as the ordering of social environment in terms of social categories, that is of groupings of persons in a manner which is meaningful to the subject. Therefore, in our discussion the term "group" denotes a cognitive entity that is meaningful to the subject at a particular point of time and must be distinguished from the way in which the term "group" is used in much of the social psychological literature where it denotes an "objective" (most often face-to-face) relationship between a number of people. In other words, social categorization is a process of bringing together social
objects or events in groups which are equivalent with regard to an individual’s actions, intentions, attitudes and systems of beliefs.

The second concept we must introduce here is that of social identity. For our purposes we shall understand social identity as that part of an individual’s self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership of a social group (or groups) together with the emotional significance attached to that membership.

Social categorization must therefore be considered as a system of orientation which creates and defines the individual’s own place in society. As Berger (1966) wrote: "Every society contains a repertoire of identities that is part of the "objective knowledge" of its members" (p.106). "Society not only defines but creates psychological reality. The individual realises himself in society - that is, he recognizes his identity in socially defined terms and these definitions become reality as he lives in society" (p.107).

Several consequences regarding group membership follow upon this "recognition of identity in socially defined terms". They can be described as follows:

a) It can be assumed that an individual will tend to remain a member of a group and seek membership of new groups if these groups have some contribution to make to the positive aspects of his social identity; i.e. to those aspects of it from which he derives some satisfaction.

b) If a group does not satisfy this requirement, the individual will tend to leave it unless

(i) leaving the group is impossible for some "objective"reasons or,
(ii) it conflicts with important values which are themselves a part of his acceptable social identity.

c) If leaving the group presents the difficulties just mentioned, then at least two solutions are possible:

(i) to change one’s interpretations of the attributes of the group so that its unwelcome features (e.g. low status) are either justified or made acceptable through a reinterpretation;
(ii) to accept the situation for what it is and engage in social action which would lead to desirable changes in the situation. (Of course, there may be various combinations of (i) and (ii), such as, for example, when the negative attributes are justified and social action to remove them is undertaken at the same time).
d) No group lives alone - all groups in society live in the midst of other groups. In other words, the "positive aspects of social identity" in (a) above, and the reinterpretation of attributes and engagement in social action in (c) above, only acquire meaning in relation to, or in comparisons with, other groups.

It is this comparative perspective that links social categorizing with social identity. In his theory of social comparison processes, Festinger (1954) hypothesized that "there exists, in the human organism, a drive to evaluate his opinions and his abilities". His second major hypothesis in the same paper was that "to the extent objective, non-social means are not available, people evaluate their opinions and abilities by comparison respectively with the opinions and abilities of others". But there are some difficulties with the conception that social comparisons only take place "to the extent that objective non-social means are not available". Festinger's example is that "one could, of course, test the opinion that an object was fragile by hitting it with a hammer". I can confirm the opinion that a bed is for lying-down-on by lying down on it until I discover that this particular bed in this particular room of the castle belonged to the Duke of Urbino and is most definitely not for lying-down-on. Very often, the "objective non-social means" that may appear to an observer to be available for the testing of opinions do not have much validity unless they are used in conjunction with the significance that they acquire in their social setting. The cases which lie outside this range are usually trivial in the analysis of social behaviour. In addition, social reality can be as "objective" as is non-social reality, and conversely "objectivity" can be as "social" as it is "physical". In some cultures, thunder and lightning are as indisputably signs of anger of supernatural powers as they are bursts of sound and light.

The criterion of "objectivity" cannot be based on classifying phenomena as being of a "social" or a "non-social" nature, with the presumed attendant consequence that opinions about them can be tested respectively by "social" or by "non-social" means. It can instead be defined in terms of the awareness (or the degree of subjective probability) that there exist alternatives to the judgement one is making. A low (or nil) probability that alternatives to
one's opinions exist may be due to the consistency over time in the checking of these opinions through non-social means, as in Festinger's example of fragility and hammer; but it may also be due to the very high social consensus about the nature of a phenomenon, independently of whether the phenomenon is thought of as being "physical", "natural" or "social". It is undoubtedly true that certainty can very often be more easily reached about the physical than about the social means of testing, but this is not a theoretical distinction between what appears and does not appear as "objective reality". It cannot be said that a human organism turns towards social means of validating opinions only when non-social means for doing so are not available. There are many examples, both in the history of science in our own culture and in the systems of knowledge of other cultures, of procedures which follow the opposite course; i.e.: they do not use the means of "physical" testing which are, in principle, available because of the very high (or complete) social consensus about the nature of a phenomenon.

Therefore, "social comparison processes" have an even wider range of application than Festinger was willing to assign to them. The range of application includes both the social context (or significance) of "non-social" testing, and the cases where the high social consensus about the nature of a phenomenon is sufficient to confer the mark of "objectivity" on opinions about it. In his theory, Festinger was mainly concerned with the social testing of opinions about characteristics of individuals, and with the resulting "relative similarity in opinions and abilities among persons who associate with one another (at least on those opinions and abilities which are relevant to that association)". The theory was primarily addressed at the within-group effects of the process of social comparison (such as pressures towards uniformity in a group) while "comparisons with members of a different status group, either higher or lower may sometimes be made on a phantasy level, but very rarely in reality". Though Festinger qualifies this statement by adding that comparisons between groups that differ are not completely eliminated, the focus of his discussion remains on individuals comparing themselves with other individuals.

On the basis of our discussion so far, we are now able to make two general statements about social categorization into groups in relation to its
function "as a system of orientation which creates and defines the individual's own place in society". The first concerns the "objective reality" of comparisons focusing on an individual as an individual and comparisons based on an individual's membership of a particular social group. With regard to the first issue, it can be said that the only "reality" tests that matter with regard to group characteristics are tests of social reality. The characteristics of one's group as a whole (such as its status, its richness or poverty, its skin colour or its ability to reach its aims) achieve most of their significance in relation to perceived differences from other groups and the value connotation of these differences. For example, economic deprivation acquires its importance in social attitudes, intentions and actions mainly when it becomes "relative deprivation"; easy or difficult access to means of production and consumption of goods, to benefits and opportunities become psychologically salient mainly in relation to comparisons with other groups; the definition of a group (national, racial or any other) makes no sense unless there are other groups around. A group becomes a group in the sense of being perceived as having common characteristics or a common fate only because other groups are present in the environment.

Thus, the psychological aspects and consequences of the membership of a group are capable of any kind of a definition only because of their insertion into a multi-group structure. Consequently, the social identity of an individual conceived as his "knowledge that he belongs to certain social groups together with some emotional and value significance to him of his membership" can only be defined through the effects of social categorizations segmenting an individual's social environment into his own group and others. A social group will, therefore, be capable of preserving its contribution to those aspects of an individual's social identity which are positively valued by him only if it manages to keep its positively valued distinctiveness from other groups. It is true, of course, that sometimes an individual may wish for his own group to be more similar than it is to certain other groups; this is usually so when these groups are considered as "superior" or "better" in some respects. However, the fact that an individual may wish for his group to be more like another in certain respects means that, in these respects, his own group is
not adequately fulfilling its function of contributing to positively valued social identity. Therefore, if it is true that social comparisons on the individual level focus, as Festinger stated, on coming closer to and associating with those who are similar to us, social comparisons between groups are focused on the establishment of distinctiveness between one's own and other groups.

The first studies on social categorization by the applicant and his colleagues, briefly summarized earlier in this proposal, provided - at best - suggestive evidence that some processes were at work in an intergroup situation which, despite their leading to strong intergroup differentiation through the behaviour of the subjects, could not be attributed either to previous hostility, or to an "objective" current conflict of interests between the groups, or to a simple version of the subjects' self-interest. These studies were in no sense experimenta crucis; but rather, they served as crutches for further thinking about the issues involved. In addition, an important methodological problem had to be dealt with before the subjects' behaviour could be seen as a consequence of social categorization into groups rather than of inter-individual similarity which was, in these experiments, associated with this categorization; i.e. the criterion for group membership was a similarity between the subjects in their performance in the first part of the experiments. There is a good deal of evidence (cf. Byrne, 1971, for a summary) that inter-individual similarities, even when they are fairly trivial, do lead the subjects in constricted experimental situations to "prefer" those who are more "like" them.

For this reason, further experiments were conducted in order to attempt a separation between the variables of inter-individual similarity and of "pure" categorization into dichotomous groups. In a two-by-two design, Billig (1972; also cf. Billig & Tajfel, 1973) compared his subjects' behaviour towards others when they were explicitly divided into groups with their behaviour when division into groups was not made explicit. He adapted for his purpose the procedure previously used in the experiments by Tajfel et al. (1971). In the first part of Billig's experiment, the subjects were asked to express their preferences for one or the other of two painters (Klee and
Kandinsky) on the basis of a number of reproductions of paintings which were shown to them on a screen. In the second part, in conditions which insured anonymity of previously expressed preferences, each subject was asked to award points (which had monetary value) between two anonymous other subjects who were designated by code numbers. There were four experimental conditions. In one condition (categorization and similarity - CS) each subject awarded points to two others, one of whom was in his own group, the group membership being based on the previously expressed preferences (the "Klee group" or the "Kandinsky group"), and one in the other group. In the second condition (categorization without similarity - CS), the subjects awarded points to two others who were also assigned to two groups (one of which was the subject's own group) but this assignment was explicitly made random, and had nothing to do with previously expressed picture preferences. In the third condition (similarity without categorization - CS), the subjects awarded points to two others whose code numbers indicated that they preferred one or the other painter, but the notion of "groups" was not introduced or mentioned at any point during the experiment. In the fourth condition (no categorization and no similarity - CS) points were awarded to two other subjects without any reference either to group membership or to picture preferences. The results were as follows: in conditions of CS and CS a significant amount of favouritism was shown towards others who were in the same group as the subject making the awards; in condition CS, there was some tendency by the subjects to favour those whose preferences were similar to their own, but this tendency did not reach the level of statistical significance; in condition CS there was no bias in favour of one or the other of the recipients of the awards. The highly significant results in conditions CS replicated those obtained in the initial experiments (Tajfel et al., 1971). But our main interest here is in the comparison between conditions CS and CS. The favouritism shown towards those who were assigned to the subject's own group without any reference to similarity in preferences (the CS condition) was considerably and significantly stronger than the non-significant tendency shown in the CS condition to favour those who, without any reference to their categorization into groups, were similar to the subject in their preferences.
It cannot be said, of course, that the subjects in condition CS did not categorize as "groups" on the basis of similarities of preferences. But the point of the experiment was that this was not an explicit categorization. Thus, the introduction of an explicit social categorization in condition CS - which was not based on any previous similarities between the individuals involved - was much more effective in producing favouritism than the introduction in condition CS of similarity between individuals which was not related to an explicit social categorization. These conclusions were confirmed in a study by Chase (1971; also cf. Hornstein, 1972) who employed a modification of the procedures used in the initial experiments (Tajfel, 1970) with groups of subjects in New York. As in Billig's experiments, no explicit categorization into groups was introduced; consequently, little or no discrimination was found.

Before going further, it may be worthwhile to emphasize the crucial differences between the sets of results we obtained and those obtained in previous work which is the nearest in its conceptions and methods to the studies described here: Sherif's work on intergroup conflict. Sherif's aim was to investigate the effects of an explicitly and clearly introduced zero-sum conflict between groups on outgroup attitudes and the subsequent behaviour of his subjects. In addition, ingroup affiliation and outgroup hostility were both intensified through prolonged intragroup interaction between the subjects. In our experiments, there was no externally defined conflict; if there was competition (i.e. actions aiming to differentiate between the groups in favour of one's own), it was fully and actively brought into the situation by the subjects themselves, as soon as the notion of "group" was introduced by the experimenters. The subjects were never together as a "group"; they neither interacted nor did they know who was in their own group and who in the other; there were no explicit social pressures on them to act in favour of their own group; and in no way was their own individual interest engaged in awarding more money to a member of their own group. On the contrary, a consistent use of the maximum joint profit strategy would have led to all of them receiving more money from the experimenters.
It is the assumed need for differentiation (or the establishment of psychological distinctiveness between the groups) which seems to me to provide, under some conditions, the major outcome of the sequence social categorization - social identity - social comparison. Related phenomena can be shown to exist in a large variety of social situations. One major example is provided by the wider social contexts in which the notion of "race" is used as a criterion for social categorization. For a number of reasons "race" has become a value-loaded term, a notion which has "surplus" value connotations. It may therefore be instructive to identify the social situations in which this notion tends to be used, or "the kinds of social differentiations in which subjective social distinctions have been made" (Rex, 1969). According to Rex, these are as follows:

1. The situation of culture contact between peoples with an advanced industrial and military technology, and hunters, pastoralists and agriculturalists at lower levels of development.
2. The situation on a slave plantation.
3. Class situations in the classic Marxist or Weberian scene in which men within the same society have different degrees of market power.
4. Status situations in which there is a concept of higher and lower but in which men are thought of as falling somewhere on a criterion of esteem rather than in mutually exclusive groups.
5. Situations of ethnic pluralism in which groups with differing cultures and/or physical characteristics work together in the same economy but retain their social and cultural identity.
6. Situations in which a minority group occupies a pariah or scape-goat role." (Rex, 1969, p.147).

In three of these six situations, value differentiations between groups or individuals are explicitly stated ("lower levels of development", "criterion of esteem", "pariah"). In the remaining three, they are not far below the surface. Whatever its other uses may be, the notion of "race" has become in its general social usage a shorthand expression which helps to create, reflect, enhance and perpetuate the perceived differences in "worth" between human groups or individuals. It contributes to making these differences as
clear-cut and inflexible as possible. Therefore, its application in the wide range of social contexts enumerated by Rex witnesses to the introduction, whenever possible, of differentiations in terms of value which increase the distinctiveness of social categories and thus contribute to their function as a guide for social action.

This establishment of distinctiveness is by no means, however, confined to situations connected with the notion of race. It finds its way, for example, into the complex effects that cultural and social relations have on the mutual comprehension and acceptance by interacting groups of their languages and dialects. Fishman (1968) recently wrote, basing his statement on linguistic evidence from West Africa, the Swahili region of Central and East Africa, New Guinea, Scandinavia and South East Asia: "Divisiveness is an ideological position and it can magnify minor differences; indeed, it can manufacture differences in language as in other matters almost as easily as it can capitalize on more obvious differences. Similarly, unification is also an ideologized position and it can minimize seemingly major differences or ignore them entirely, whether these be in the realm of languages, religion, culture, race, or any other basis of differentiation" (p. 45). Fishman's "ideologized positions" are positions in which similarities or differences, which could in principle be entirely "neutral" (e.g. between languages, landscapes, flags, anthems, postage stamps, football teams and almost anything else) become endowed with emotional significance because they relate to a superordinate value, such as is the case with nationalism in Fishman's own discussion.

The present research proposal postulates that the reason for this behavioural and evaluative intergroup differentiation is in the need that the subjects have to provide order, meaning and social identity to the experimental situation; and that this need is fulfilled through the creation of intergroup differences when such differences do not in fact exist, or the attribution of value to, and the enhancement of, whatever differences that do exist.
II. Intergroup hypotheses in social contexts

The sequence of social categorization - social identity - social comparison - psychological distinctiveness will now be discussed from the point of view of hypotheses which can be derived from it. This will be done in two stages: first, in terms of examples in relatively concrete social contexts which seem to provide intuitive support to the causal sequence outlined above; and second, in terms of research hypotheses which will guide the studies arising from the present proposal.

Social categorization will be considered here as the first link in the sequence (although some social situations create a need to categorize arising out of a variety of preliminary conditions, in which case the act of categorizing the social world into groups becomes an effect of these conditions). In our experiments which were previously described, as in those of Sherif and in other related studies, this categorization was provided by the experimenters. If the experimenters' arbitrary introduction of dichotomous categories leads to differential intergroup behaviour following the lines of the imposed divisions, one can conclude that there is an approximate identity of the experimenters' and the subjects' structuring of the social world in terms of different groups. This is not a tautology, since there is no a priori reason why the subjects should behave in terms of a division into groups based on guessing numbers of dots, preferring one or another painter or - as in the extreme case of Billig's (1972) experiments - on the toss of a coin.

When one leaves the "minimal" situations, the problem of defining or identifying the pre-existing categories becomes much easier, since the information about them can be obtained either directly from the subjects or by observing "natural" situations, or - ideally - by coordinating both these sources of information.

Our interest in the concept of social identity, as defined earlier in the proposal, is not in attempts to describe it for "what it is" in a static sense - a daunting task which has baffled many social scientists of various persuasions and for which one lacks both optimism and temerity. Social identity is understood here as an intervening causal mechanism in situations
of social change (cf. Tajfel, 1972b) - observed, anticipated, feared, desired, or prepared by the individuals involved; and the effects of these changes on their subsequent intergroup behaviour and attitudes. From this point of view, three categories of situations appear crucial:

(i) The badly defined or marginal social situation of a group, which presents the individuals involved with difficulties of defining their place in a social system;

(ii) The groups socially defined and consensually accepted as "superior" at a point of time when this definition is threatened either by occurring or impending social change, or by a conflict of values inherent in the "superiority";

(iii) The groups socially defined and consensually accepted as "inferior" at a point of time when - for whatever reasons - either (a) members of a group have engaged in a shared prise de conscience of their inferior status; or (b) they have become aware of the feasibility of working towards alternatives to the existing situation; or a combination of (a) and (b), which may also imply (a) leading to (b), or (b) leading to (a).

The "dynamic" approach to problems of social identity adopted in this discussion is based on several considerations. First, it is unlikely that there exist many examples of intergroup situations which are static in the sense that they consist of an unchanging set of social relationships between the groups. We are, however, less concerned here with social situations than with their psychological counterparts; these are bound to be even less static. This becomes quite clear when one reconsiders briefly for the purpose at hand the focal problem of this proposal: that of social identity understood as deriving in a comparative and "relational" manner from an individual's group memberships.

For the purpose of our argument, one can distinguish between "secure" and "insecure" social identity. A completely secure social identity would imply a relationship between two (or more) groups in which a change in the texture of psychological distinctiveness between them is not conceivable. For an "inferior" group this would imply the existence of a total consensus about the nature and the future of their inferiority; in other words, to return to our previous discussion (cf. p. 8 of "social reality" as related to Festinger's theory of social comparison (1954), there would have to exist a complete psychological
"objectification" of a social status quo with no cognitive alternatives of any kind available to challenge the existing social reality. It is possible that historians and social anthropologists could provide some relevant examples in completely stable and isolated societies; these examples could hardly, however, find their counterpart in most of the contemporary world.

A completely secure social identity for a group consensually superior is almost an empirical impossibility. The kind of psychological distinctiveness that insures their unchallenged superiority must not only be gained; it must also be preserved. And it can be preserved only if social conditions of distinctiveness are carefully perpetuated, together with the signs and symbols of distinctive status without which the attitudes of complete consensus about superior distinctiveness are in the danger of disintegrating. In this sense, therefore, even in the most rigid caste system (be it racial or any other), the social distinctions which may appear very stable are related to a continuously dynamic psychological situation in which a superior group can never stop working at the preservation of its distinctiveness. It is very difficult to think of cases of intergroup relations which would present exceptions to this statement, apart perhaps from infants and teachers in a nursery school. (This also happens to be the exception for which it is difficult to imagine the possibility of a sustained and socially shared pattern of intergroup discrimination based on hostility).

A more serious example can probably be found in the notions about the "nature" and the relative roles and positions of men and women prevailing in some cultures and some historical periods. In these cases, the massive acceptance by both sides of certain kinds of psychological intergroup distinctiveness prevents the occurrence of serious and socially shared identity problems. It is, however, interesting to see that as soon as these accepted notions are seriously challenged, the intergroup attitudes undergo certain changes which are in line with the present argument. The psychological differentiations of sexes, as long as they are highly consensual, are not accompanied by, or related to, attitudes of intergroup hostility; however, the new search by an active minority in the "inferior" group of distinctiveness on an equal level creates, in some cases, explicit outgroup hostility on one side and equally hostile defensive reactions on the other (Doise & Weinberger, 1973). The impact of the implicit and socially shared problems of identity which are involved can perhaps be
gauged from the extent of coverage given by various communication media to all kinds of scientific and pseudo-scientific pronouncements about the "nature" of psychological sex differences.

For all the reasons outlined above, this research proposal will thus be concerned with cases of insecure social identity. These will be discussed in terms of a two-by-two table, in which the two criteria for categorization are: consensually "superior" versus "inferior" groups; and the individual's ability to "pass" from one group to another.

The first of these criteria is justified because, as will be seen later, different hypotheses pertain to the two kinds of groups. The second criterion appears basic on a priori grounds. In each individual's life there will be situations in which he acts, exclusively or mainly, as an individual rather than as a member of a group; there will be others in which he acts, exclusively or mainly, in terms of his group membership. One of the important determinants of an individual's choice to act in terms of self rather than in terms of his group is what we shall refer to in this discussion as "social mobility" as contrasted with "social change". The former refers to situations in which it is relatively easy to move individually from one social group to another; so that, if a group does not contribute adequately to an individual's social identity, one of the more obvious solutions for him is to move, or attempt to move, to another group. In the latter class are those situations in which, for whatever reasons, "passing" from one group to another is very difficult or impossible. It may be expected that, in these situations, there will be many occasions (and constraints) leading an individual to act as a member of his group, or at least in the knowledge that he is categorized as such. Social change (as distinct from social mobility) refers therefore in this discussion to changes in the relationships between the groups as a whole, to expectations, fears or desires of such changes, to actions aiming at inducing or preventing them, or to intentions and plans to engage in these actions. The psychological counterpart of social change, in the limited sense of the term adopted here, is therefore in the individual's awareness that many important aspects of his life, including the acquisition or preservation of an acceptable social identity, can only be based on a change (or resistance to change) in the image, position or circumstances of his group as a whole.
The resulting two-by-two classification of cases and predictions arising from them can therefore be presented as follows:

**Insecure Intergroup social comparisons**

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<th>Conditions conducive to leaving one's group</th>
<th>Conditions conducive to staying in one's group</th>
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<td>Consensually</td>
<td>A</td>
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<td>superior groups</td>
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<td>inferior groups</td>
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1) **Superior groups (Boxes A and B)**

Insecure social comparisons arising within a group which is consensually defined as being of higher status can be due to two sets of conditions:

(a) The group's superior status is threatened (or perceived as threatened) by another group;

(b) The superior status is related to a conflict of values: i.e., it is conceived by some as based on unfair advantages, various other forms of injustice, exploitation, illegitimate use of force, etc.

In the case (a), Box A is not likely to contain many instances as long as the threat does not become overwhelming. It will contain hardly any instances in situations in which "passing" is very difficult (e.g., an apartheid society). In Box B one can predict an intensification of precautions aiming to keep the superior group in its position. On the level more specifically related to the present discussion, the level of social intergroup comparison, one can predict the creation and use of new conditions which will enable the superior group to preserve and enhance its psychological distinctiveness. This may take many forms, such as social and psychological separation of many kinds, creation of a variety of distinctive symbols, etc.

In the case (b), conflict of values, two sub-cases must be distinguished:

(i) The conflict of values is of such intensity that it destroys the positive contribution to social identity that the group provides. This is Box A which contains "conditions conducive to leaving one’s own group": e.g., upper or middle class revolutionaries, "renegades" of all kinds, etc. There will be
here no discrimination against the outgroup and no hostility against it. But this is hardly an interesting intergroup prediction since group membership is often cancelled for all practical purposes, or even sometimes positively reversed. In the case of reversal, the "renegades" become some of the most active members of the inferior group and present, often in an intensified form, the characteristics which will be discussed later in relation to Box D.

(ii) The conflict of values exists, but ingroup affiliation is sufficiently powerful to remain the determinant of attitudes and behaviour. This is again Box B. The conflict of values can only be resolved through finding new justifications for the maintenance of status quo. This is the condition for the creation and adoption at large by the members of a group of new "ideologies" (e.g. the "white man's burden", the "inherent superiority" due to unbridgeable innate differences, the "saving of souls", etc.). These ideologies represent the creation of new forms of psychological distinctiveness and the enhancement of those amongst the old ones which are still serviceable. The clearer are the "objective" conditions preventing the leaving of one's group (such as racial differences, powerfully sanctioned religious differences, etc.), the more likely it is that the conflict of values will result in the creation and wide and easy diffusion of these new and enhanced forms of psychological distinctiveness.

A note must be inserted here so that the analytic distinctions just made do not distort the psychological realities of the situations which are being considered. The actions and attitudes directed towards the preservation of the status quo in the case (a) discussed above (i.e. threat from another group) contain sometimes the seeds of a "secondary" conflict of values: an intensification of discriminatory behaviour and of hostile attitudes following upon this threat may clash with generally accepted values representing the "official" ideology of a society such as, for example, Christian ethics. In such cases, there is a merging of the effects described above for cases (a) and (b) (ii). The psychological origins of the situations are, however, different. In the case (a) the inferior group is perceived as a threat to the status quo, both social and psychological, and the drive towards increased distinctiveness aims both at the preservation of the previously existing differentiations and (in some cultural contexts) at the justification of consequent actions. In the case (b) (ii) there need not be, at the origin, a perception of threat to distinctiveness since -
as for example, in the early colonial situations - the wide differences between
the groups are there for all to see. There may even occur an idealization of the
outgroup (cf. e.g. Kiernan, 1972, about the myth of the "noble savage" in the
XVIIIth century and later), as long as the myth-makers and those who accept
their images have nothing directly to do with the outlandish creatures so
beautifully portrayed. When, however, direct interaction of certain kinds
begins, in which what is done to some people is not usually done to others,
justifications and reasons must be found. This is, of course, a well-known
and well-documented sequence of events. Its relation to the main argument of
this proposal is that, as in the case (a), the psychological "structure" which
is the most convenient, both cognitively and affectively, for resolving the
ensuing conflict of values and thus preserving intact a positive social identity,
is the creation and enhancement of the appropriate forms of psychological
distinctiveness between the groups.

2) Inferior groups (Boxes C and D)

(a) Box C: Conditions conducive to leaving one's own group.

These are the situations of social mobility as defined earlier: There is
enough social flexibility to enable an individual to move, or hope to move, from
one group to another; there are no serious social sanctions from either of the
groups for moving; and no serious conflict of values involved in moving. One
should expect that after having joined the superior group or even before, some
individuals will work harder than most at establishing their clear-cut distinct­
iveness from the perceived inadequacies of their past social identity.

(b) Box D: Conditions conducive to staying in one's own group.

This box presents a much greater interest from the point of view of inter-
group attitudes and behaviour than the previous one. The major social conditions
are: any form of caste system (whether determined by birth, race or other
criteria); or any other social differentiation system which, for whatever reasons,
makes it difficult to move. The two major psychological conditions are: a
strong conflict of values inherent in leaving one's group; or the fear of powerful
social sanctions for so doing; or both in combination. In most situations the
social and psychological conditions will, of course, interact and reinforce
each other.
The assumption is made here (see p. 16 above) that, in many of these conditions, the problems of social identity of the inferior group would not necessarily express themselves in social behaviour until and unless there is some awareness that the existing social reality is not the only possible one and that alternatives to it are conceivable and perhaps attainable. If this awareness exists, the problems of social identity confronting the members of inferior groups can be solved in one of several ways, or a combination of more than one:

(i) To become, through action and reinterpretation of group characteristics, more like the superior group. (It will be remembered that, in view of the difficulty of "passing" implied here, this cannot become a widespread individual solution; it will have to apply to the group as a whole).

(ii) To reinterpret the existing inferior characteristics of the group, so that they do not appear as inferior but acquire a positively valued distinctiveness from the superior group.

(iii) To create, through social action and/or diffusion of new "ideologies" new group characteristics which have a positively valued distinctiveness from the superior group.

A parenthesis must be inserted here before these three solutions are briefly considered. It concerns the meaning in this discussion of the terms "inferior" and "superior". This distinction must be understood, of course, in the context of its social derivation; for example, black skin is not, outside of specific social contexts, either an inferior or a superior attribute. But it becomes one, given certain social-psychological conditions. In principle, any group characteristic could become (and most do) value-laden in this sense. One can note, for example, the persistence even today of blond hair and blue eyes in a large proportion of the dauntless heroes of war comics; or the significance that long hair has recently acquired in a variety of social contexts - both for those who use it for its distinctiveness and for those who use it as an identifying sign of moral turpitude.

The first solution, which is that of cultural, social and psychological assimilation of a group as a whole, is sometimes possible. One might even predict that, given favourable conditions, it could become the solution to be tried first. In order, however, for a group as a whole to succeed in eliminating both its social and psychological inferiority, one process must first take place:
the breaking down of the barriers preventing the group from obtaining improved access to conditions which it could not previously obtain. As soon as this happens, one of two psychological processes will tend to appear: if the group remains separate, a general reinterpretation of its distinctive characteristics in new and positively valued terms; or, alternatively, the breakdown on both sides of the psychological barriers to "passing". The first of these merges with the solution (ii) which will be discussed below; the second may finally lead to the disappearance of a group as it merges with another. The consequences of a relative decrease in antisemitism in some countries after the last war exemplify, in relation to Jews who do not live in Israel, the functioning of both these processes.

It may be expected that the solutions (ii) and (iii) mentioned above will appear in conjunction, and that social action will be an important ingredient of both; but for the sake of empirical distinctions they will be discussed separately. It will be remembered that both originate in situations where, for whatever reasons, the inferior group is not able to merge with the superior one, nor can the individual members of it leave their own group and join another.

Solution (ii) implies that, with the prise de conscience of the illegitimacy of a previously consensual inferiority, a new kind of distinctiveness must be created on the basis of some existing group characteristics. The clearest recent example of the whole process can be found in the psychological changes that are taking place amongst the American blacks. The very use of the term "blacks" in this text, which would have had very different connotations only a few years ago, already testifies to these changes. The old interpretations of distinctiveness are rejected; the old characteristics are being given a new meaning of different but equal or superior. Examples abound: the beauty of blackness, the African hair-do, the African cultural past and traditions, the reinterpretation of Negro music from "entertainment" to a form or art which has deep roots in a separate cultural tradition; the taking over or re-creating, at one time, of certain aspects of ideas about nègritude, etc. At the same time, the old attempts to be "a little more" like the other group are proudly rejected: no more straightening of hair for beautiful black girls or using of various procedures for lightening the skin. The accents, dialects, sway of the body, rhythms of dancing, texture of
the details of interpersonal communication - all this is preserved, enhanced and re-evaluated. The prise de conscience starts, as it is often the case, with an active minority (cf. Moscovici 1973). As the new-found distinctiveness does do its job of creating a positive and healing new version of social identity, the prediction can be made that all its forms will find an easy and widespread diffusion at large.

Solution (iii), the creation or invention of new characteristics which establish a positively valued group distinctiveness, is structurally similar to solution (ii). Examples of it can be found in the development of new nationalisms (cf. Tajfel, 1969b, 1970b). "In many new nations the need is felt to stress or create common bonds in order to force the pace of the development of nationhood. The forging of bonds need not be of a "racial" kind, though it has often been of this nature, particularly in the young European nationalisms of the XIXth century. The phenomenon is even clearer in racism, old or new; the racist ideologies have always been characterized by a frantic search for common bonds of an "innate" or "instinctive" nature in the distant past so as to provide a justification for the claim of the special sort of unity that the racial group is supposed to have and of its inherent and immutable differences from other such groups". (Tajfel, 1969b, p.139; cf. Shafer, 1955, for a general discussion of the creation of various categories of national myths).

The creation of new distinctive characteristics implies however a new problem. This problem also exists in some measure in the process of the reevaluation of the existing characteristics (solution (iii)), but it becomes particularly clear when new forms of distinctiveness need to be either invented or created through action. It has been postulated throughout this discussion that the aim of positively valued psychological distinctiveness is to achieve an adequate form of social identity; and that the only means by which this aim can be attained is in the establishment of appropriate kinds of intergroup comparison. There are two stages in this process which, ideally, both need to be successfully realised. The first (which is a condition sine qua non for the success of the enterprise) is the positive evaluation by the ingroup of its newly created characteristics. The second stage consists of the acceptance by the outgroup of this evaluation. The issue is, however, slightly more
The new characteristics of the inferior group can be of two kinds:

(a) They may consist of attributes which are already consensually highly valued by both (or more) groups, and which the inferior group was previously deemed not to possess. In this case, there is no problem of re-evaluation of attributes. The social comparison problem for the inferior group is: will the others acknowledge the new image, separate but equal or superior, on consensually valued dimensions? An example can perhaps be found in some new and widely diffused aspects of Jewish identity (cf. Herman, 1970). Amongst aspects of group identity unacceptable to the young post-war generations of Jews was their elders' passive acceptance of a wholesale slaughter of a people. The exceptions, such as the uprising of the ghetto of Warsaw or the revolts in Treblinka and other concentration camps, became therefore crucial symbols; so has the Masada story, long back from the past, and in the present the military prowess of the new state of Israel. One may perhaps be permitted to include an anecdote, not in any sense as any form of proof but as an illustration of a theoretical argument. Some time ago I found myself at the Place Denfert-Rochereau in Paris in the middle of one of the numerous political demonstrations of the Spring 1973. These are occasions at which everyone talks to everyone else, and next to me at the table of a café a heated argument about the Middle East conflict developed between three middle aged men: two Italian gauchiste intellectuals and an Israeli secondary school teacher. After a series of successive explosions on both sides, the Israeli finally produced his own ambiguous and conflicted statement of new identity which went verbatim as follows: "Maintenant que nous avons prouvé que nous pouvons être des assassins comme tous les autres, tout le monde nous respecte." ("Now that we have proved that we can be assassins like everybody else, everyone respects us"). The conflict inherent in this statement is a conflict of two kinds of social identity: on the one hand, the great cultural and social traditions of Jewish humanism, seen as different but equal or superior; and on the other, the socially comparative justification of new aspects of identity forged in the aftermath of a tragedy and seen as appropriate in view of the recent past or of the present political situation.
(b) The second case concerns situations in which the new characteristics of an inferior group are not consensually valued, to begin with. The social comparison problem of the second stage for the inferior group then becomes: will the others acknowledge the new image, different but equal or superior? This is therefore the problem of acknowledgement by others through a re-evaluation of attributes; it also applies to the previously discussed solution (ii) in which the inferior group invests its already existing separate characteristics with a new significance. A good example can be found in field experiments reported by Lemaine (Lemaine, 1966; Lemaine and Kastersztein, 1971-2). In one of the studies, a competition to build huts was arranged between two groups of boys at a summer camp— but one group was given less adequate building materials than the other. Both groups were aware of the discrepancy which was based on an explicitly random distribution of resources between them. The "inferior" group consequently engaged in two sequences of behaviour: first, they built an inferior hut but surrounded it with a small garden; and then they "engaged in sharp discussions with the children from the other group and the adult judges to obtain an acknowledgement of the legitimacy of their work. Their arguments were approximately as follows: we are willing to admit that the others have built a hut and that their hut is better than ours; but it must equally be admitted that our small garden with its fence surrounding the hut is also a part of the hut and that we are clearly superior on this criterion of comparison." (Lemaine and Kastersztein, 1971-2, p. 675, translated from the French).

The importance of the second stage, as just discussed, from the point of view of our theoretical argument is that its consideration leads to some crucial predictions about intergroup behaviour. The battle for legitimacy, in which Lemaine's subjects engaged, is a battle for the acceptance by others of new forms of intergroup comparison. As long as these are not consensually accepted, the new characteristics (or the re-evaluation of the old ones) cannot be fully adequate in their function of building a new social identity. At the same time, there will be many instances in which the superior group, for the sake of its own social identity, cannot accept one of the three forms of change discussed above: admission (i) that, despite the previously existing stereo-
types, the inferior group possesses some of the common attributes which are highly valued; (ii) that its old distinctive attributes are at the positive end of a valued dimension; and (iii) that its newly emerging attributes are of a kind that should be positively evaluated. It is at this point of the conflict between comparative social identities that the causal processes discussed here lead to the prediction of intense hostility in intergroup attitudes and of marked discrimination in intergroup behaviour.

An attempt was made in the present section of this proposal to provide a link between the general theoretical formulations of the introductory section and the research plans of the section to follow. This link was sought in a consideration, in part speculative, of the postulated processes as they might operate in concrete social contexts. Before proceeding to a discussion of the research plans, it may be worthwhile to emphasize clearly the differences between intergroup processes arising from an "objective" conflict of goals (as in Sherif's work and related approaches to the problem) and intergroup competition, as discussed here, which derives from processes of social comparison. This has been succinctly done in a recent paper by Turner (1973a):

"We have been led to processes of competition that might be expected to operate in many intergroup situations but do not require conditions defined by realistic interest or conflict and rivalry for a material reward or goal. (Of course positive social identity may be termed a goal but the point is that this competition requires no goal which is desirable to both groups of itself and would act as a reward in some non-intergroup situation). The processes of competition which follow from the notion of social identity - hereafter called 'social competition' - arise from the very nature of an intergroup situation where 'comparable' action is possible that is associated with a shared value differential.

To conclude this introductory discussion it is worth making an explicit distinction between four kinds of intergroup competition. This classification will be helpful from the standpoint of gauging how much of an explanatory burden social competition may be required to carry. Firstly, there is competition which is characterized primarily by the independent desires of various groups for a material reward which can be gained by only one group. 'Material' is not
meant narrowly; it could, for example, encompass such things as control of a political or social institution. The theme of this competition is expressed by the notion of a 'conflict of interests'. At the other pole, there is what we have referred to as 'social competition', arising from the social comparative aspects of social identity as they interact with shared values. Its generally necessary conditions (their sufficiency is a larger problem) are the salience of the inter-group situation and the possibility of differentially valued actions relevant to the particular social categorization (i.e., for our purposes into 'groups').

The third type of competition is defined by the overlap between the first two: where a material reward to some extent valued of itself serves as a token or symbol of a value differential associated with a possible social comparison between groups. It is an open question whether competition in this case has its own distinct behavioural repercussions or whether this kind of situation tends to collapse into one of the other two types, depending on for instance just how much independent value is possessed by the token or the degree of arbitrariness in the relation between symbol and symbolized. It is of interest because intuitively many workers tend to assume that the use of, for example, small monetary rewards produces a conflict of interest situation whereas in fact their results often seem more intelligible if one assumes that the reward had an especial effect only in so far as it helped to make salient the possibility of what is properly called social competition.

A fourth type of competition or competitive situation is worth suggesting although it will not be discussed in any detail: it is the counterpart of the third type in that it is defined to some extent by an overlap between the first two and is presumably a form of transition between them. It differs in the direction of transition, i.e., in this case it is a social-competitive situation that gives rise to a conflict of interest. This might happen when comparison results in a stable and explicit inequity between two groups and thus the desire for positive self-evaluation leads to directly conflicting group interests with regard to the maintenance of the comparative situation as a whole.

Articles by Thibaut (1950), Kelley (1951), and Manheim (1960) provide some support for the idea that such a stable inequity is an important factor affecting the development of social competition into intergroup hostility." (Turner, 1973a, pp. 6-7).
III. Research plans and methods

The testing of the hypotheses deriving from the discussion presented in the two preceding sections of this proposal imposes two preliminary requirements which are interdependent and need to be briefly discussed. They are: acting in terms of group rather than in terms of self; and a clear dichotomization by the acting individual of his social world into non-overlapping social groups.

The behaviour of each individual can be seen as varying on a continuum, one extreme of which consists of acting fully in terms of self and the other of acting fully in terms of his group. These are theoretical extremes which are probably never reached in actual behaviour since it is difficult to conceive, on the one hand, of any social act which would not be to some extent affected by an individual's membership of various social categories and their relation to the social categories of those with whom he interacts; on the other hand, any action undertaken in terms of group membership will always include some aspects specific to the individual's own background, aims and motives which cannot be fully identified with the interests of the group in terms of which he is acting.

In the experiments described in the previous sections of this proposal (Tajfel et al., 1971, and the subsequent studies), acting in terms of group was achieved by the simple device of eliminating response in terms of self through requesting the subjects to divide bonuses between two other people. The discriminating nature of the subjects' response, based as they were on trivial or random criteria of social categorization, can thus be attributed to the nature of the experimental situation. Or, as Sole et al. (1973) recently wrote: "Why, then, on the basis of what would certainly appear to be trivial similarity and dissimilarity, do Tajfel's subjects dichotomize their worlds to form "we" and "they" groups? Why do Tajfel's subjects engage in social discrimination? At first glance it would seem plausible enough to assume that perceptual ability in judging quantities of dots is a trivial criterion for category membership. But consider once again the subject in Tajfel's experiments: he finds himself in a situation which is, at once, socially impoverished and constraining of his behaviour. He is given precious little on which he may base his decision, and he is forced to use what he is given. The crucial issue here is that to the
subject in such a situation there can be no trivial criteria. It is only when one views his plight from the contextually rich "outside world" that the information he is offered seems trivial", (p. 22).

In a recent experiment, Turner (1973b) reintroduced within the same kind of experimental design the possibility of acting in terms of self. The study was of a 2 x 2 x 2 design. After the preliminary induction of social categorization through aesthetic preferences, as in some of the previous experiments, in one of the experimental conditions the subjects first decided on a division of money between self and an alter who was either in their own group or in the outgroup; then they went on to deciding on awards between two others, one from the ingroup and one from the outgroup as in the previous experiments. Subjects in another condition had this sequence reversed: first, they worked on decisions between two others, and then went on to decisions between self and an alter who was either in the ingroup or in the outgroup. In other conditions subjects underwent identical procedures with the only difference that their decisions did not relate to amounts of money but to unspecified "points" which had no value of any kind. Out of a complex set of results, the following are the most relevant here:

(i) In all "other-other" conditions, outgroup discrimination was shown;

(ii) There was no outgroup discrimination (but only discrimination in favour of self) when the choice between self and an ingroup or outgroup alter came first in the sequence of decisions; when the choice between self and an ingroup or outgroup alter came second in the sequence of decisions (i.e. after a set of alter-alter decision) the subjects, in addition to discriminating in favour of self, also allotted less to the members of the outgroup than to those of the ingroup.

The second finding, which conformed to Turner's experimental predictions, can be generally restated as follows: there is a variety of conditions which determine a choice between actions in terms of self or of group; they can be summarized as conditions which increase the salience of group membership. In the conditions of Turner's experiments where self-other decisions came before the other-other decisions, acting in terms of self became the focus of the subjects' decisions, and no discrimination between others belonging to
the ingroup and to the outgroup was shown in the self-other decisions, although such discrimination did show itself when the other-other decisions were involved. When, however, the other-other decisions preceded the self-other decisions, the latter were affected by the salience of group membership which had been the focus of the first part of the experimental condition.

The results of the experimental studies so far described and the consideration of "real" social situations in the preceding section of this proposal lead to the conclusion that two interdependent conditions are basic in determining behaviour in terms of group rather than in terms of self. They are: the dichotomization of the social world into clearly distinct and non-overlapping categories (see previous section and also Hornstein, 1972, for supplementary evidence); and the impossibility or serious difficulty in "passing" from one group to another (cf. the earlier discussion of "social mobility" vs. "social change"). There are undoubtedly many other conditions which are also important in increasing or decreasing the salience of group membership, and some of them will be included in the research plans outlined in this section of the proposal. But acting in terms of group rather than in terms of self cannot be expected to play a predominant part in an individual's behaviour unless there is present a clear cognitive structure of "us" and "them" and unless this structure is not perceived as capable of being easily shifted in a variety of social and psychological conditions.

The hypotheses with which the research proposed here will be concerned fall broadly into two categories: in the first are those which relate to the establishment of the general principle that the achievement of psychological intergroup distinctiveness is one of the autonomous aims of behaviour in which individuals engage in certain kinds of intergroup situations; in the second category are the hypotheses aiming to articulate the various ways in which distinctiveness can be achieved under specified conditions. All the hypotheses in both categories derive from the argument presented in the previous two sections of the proposal. As, however, there is considerable empirical overlap between establishing the principle of distinctiveness and the various intergroup conducts that can be used to achieve this end, the research plans will be outlined according to the following empirical categories:
It must be remembered that we are not concerned here with validating assumptions which would contradict the postulation of alternative causal processes. The aim of the research is not to show that the "objective" conflicts of interest between groups or the previously existing attitudes do not have certain well-known effects in intergroup behaviour; it is rather to show that in addition to these other causal processes, the establishment of psychological intergroup distinctiveness has its autonomous functions in intergroup behaviour. Therefore, the main methodological requirement of the research is not to devise "crucial" situations in which the postulation of one of two causal processes is shown to be correct, but rather to eliminate - as fully as this can be achieved - variables other than those from which behaviour aiming to establish psychological distinctiveness can be predicted.

(a) Objective conflict of interest, group identity and intergroup behaviour. The distinction between these two determinants of intergroup behaviour was defined and discussed in some detail in the previous sections of this proposal. The aim of the research is to show:

(i) that when a group provides its members with inadequate social identity, this will result in attempts to establish positively valued psychological distinctiveness from comparison groups. This process must be shown to exist independently of intergroup conflicts of other interests;

(ii) the above sequence will, in some conditions of inadequate identity, show itself even if the achievement of distinctiveness conflicts with the possibility of obtaining relatively higher "objective" rewards of various kinds (the sub-section (b) below on relative deprivation will be directly relevant here).
We already have some indications from our previous research that the achievement of positive distinctiveness can be an autonomous goal of intergroup behaviour (e.g. the importance of the MD - maximum difference between the groups in favour of one's own, cf. p. 1 - in the experiments by Tajfel et al. and in some of the subsequent studies; and intergroup discrimination in the distribution of valueless "points" in the experiments by Turner). The aim of the proposed research will be to articulate these phenomena more clearly as our previous research was not specifically designed for this purpose and did not therefore include the necessary set of alternative conditions.

The general design of the experiments will be as follows:

**Condition (i):** Objective conflict of interests (e.g. competitive distribution of concrete rewards) - satisfactory psychological distinctiveness from another group (experimentally induced through feedback about "superior" performance on a relevant and valued criterion) - evaluations of the ingroup and the outgroup and decisions about a second distribution of rewards to other subjects, members of the ingroup and the outgroup.

**Condition (ii):** No objective conflict of interests - unsatisfactory psychological distinctiveness from another group (experimentally induced as above) - dependent variables as in condition (i) above. The prediction here is that intergroup discrimination will appear in both kinds of dependent variables (evaluations and distributions of rewards to other people). More generally, the prediction is that the subjects will use whatever channel is available to them to distinguish positively their own group from the outgroup; so that if the first activity requested of them is a set of decisions about distribution of material rewards to others without information that evaluations will be requested later, there will be relatively stronger intergroup discrimination in these distributions; and that the same will be true of evaluations if they come first.

No predictions can be made on the basis of the present discussion about the differences between conditions (i) and (ii) in the relative degree of intergroup discrimination. The only predictions we can make at present is that in both conditions discrimination will occur. Its appearance in condition (i) can be understood as the effect of an intergroup conflict of interests; if discrimination occurs in condition (ii), it cannot be attributed either to an objective conflict of interests or to previously existing attitudes of intergroup hostility.
Condition (iii): No objective conflict of interests - satisfactory psychological distinctiveness from another group. The prediction here is that no intergroup discrimination will be shown on any of the measures.

Condition (iv): Objective conflict of interests - unsatisfactory psychological distinctiveness from another group. Predictions are as for conditions (i) and (ii) above, with more marked intergroup discrimination on the relevant dependent variables.

Several experiments will be conducted within this general design. It is intended to use in some of them as means of the second distribution of material rewards (decided upon by the subjects) the payment matrices previously employed in the Tajfel et al. and subsequent experiments. These matrices have proved flexible and easily adaptable to the measurement of a number of dependent variables; and successful in discriminating between the diverse determinants of the subjects' choices. The dependent variables of evaluation will be adapted to the subjects' populations and to the experimental tasks so that they are seen as relevant to the situation and sensible. Whenever necessary, pilot studies will be conducted to determine an appropriate content for the evaluations.

In the above experiments, as in the subsequent ones, a complete de-briefing of the subjects will take place at the end of the studies, whenever such de-briefing is made necessary by the nature of the experimental situation.

(b) Relative deprivation, absolute deprivation and intergroup behaviour.

One of the basic aspects of the experimental research outlined above is the existence of status or social differentials between the groups which will be induced by a variety of experimental procedures. Such differentials also exist in a very large variety of natural social settings, and many of them present a dual aspect: differences between the groups in, for example, salaries or wages either create or are reflected in, or determined by, differences in status and the social prestige of the various groups. There are cases of industrial and other disputes where it seems that the structure of salary differentials is as important as the absolute amounts that are being claimed. The research problem for us will be to identify some social situations in which salary differentials represent an important dimension of a group's identity and then
to assess the relative importance to members of the group of changes in differentials as compared with changes in the absolute level of salaries. Our predictions here are derived from the more general hypotheses (i) and (ii) stated above (cf. p.; 32): that whenever level of salary can be shown to be relevant to the group's perception of its comparative status in relation to other groups, the establishment of certain kinds of new differentials (or the preservation of the old ones if they are favourable to the group) will have an autonomous function in salary claims, independent of, or additional to, the claims for more money per se.

Salary differentials have been singled out as the first example of settings in which our hypotheses might be tested because it is the most obvious one. We hope, however, to find settings of other kinds in which social differentials can be identified and, to some extent, manipulated. (The armed forces with their clear-cut system of symbols of rank differences would be an ideal example, but it is rather difficult to foresee whether one would receive a favourable reaction to the suggestion that we should be allowed to work on this problem). Whether, however, we work on salary or on other differentials, the first phase of the field research will be a preliminary assessment of the subjective relevance of a given dimension to the group's perception of its adequate or inadequate social identity. This will be done through: (i) a series of open-ended interviews; (ii) construction of scales derived from these interviews on which the subjects will be invited to place their own and other comparison groups. A similar procedure has been recently used successfully in research conducted at present at the University of Leiden by A. van Knippenberg under the supervision of the author of this proposal and Professor J.P. van de Geer. In this research certain comparisons between groups made under a variety of conditions were elicited from engineering students of technical colleges and of institutes of technology in The Netherlands, between whom exist status and prestige differences acknowledged by both sides. The resulting intergroup evaluations are being subjected to multivariate analysis (Tajfel and van de Geer, 1972).

In view of the difficulty of knowing in advance which settings and dimensions will prove relevant to our hypotheses and, amongst those, which would present institutional facilities enabling us to work, no more can be done
at present than outlining a procedural example which might have to be considerably modified or completely changed. In Britain, there are certain acknowledged status differences between lecturers in various types of institutions of tertiary education. These differences are sometimes related to salary differences either in the general level of salaries, or in the salaries at the point of entry into the system, or in the maximum level attained, or in the size of increments. In addition, there are other differences which are capable of fairly clear definitions such as the teaching load, the length of vacations, the degree of freedom in distributing one's work load, etc. It should be possible to establish, through a series of interviews, the importance of these various factors to a group's perception of its comparative status. If, for example, the salary differentials proved to be important in this comparative perspective, we would present a number of respondents with a series of suggested salary scales for their own group and other relevant groups asking them to rank these in order of preference. The structure of these scales would be such that they would present either a combination of, or a conflict between, "absolute" advantages and comparative differential advantages and disadvantages for the respondents' own group and the other groups. Our predictions are, as stated above, that the differentials would have an autonomous function, particularly with regard to groups of "inferior" status.

We also hope to identify some industrial settings in which similar procedures could be used. One particular industrial setting could prove especially valuable, although there are good reasons to believe that research within it may not prove possible because of the social and political sensitivity of the issues involved. We shall, however, try. Last year there was a strike by Pakistani workers in a factory in the Midlands; it was mainly concerned with demands for a better promotion structure for the Pakistanis. Despite the fact that the strike was made official by the union, it enjoyed only a very limited support from the other workers in the factory. A strike of foreign workers on a much wider scale and concerned with similar differentials took place in April of this year at the Renault works near Paris. In this case some of the support for it was only given after some delay, when it was realised that the foreign workers' strike, rather unexpectedly, brought all of the work in the factories to a complete halt. In these cases, our interest would be
primarily in the attitudes of the "superior" groups, particularly of those native workers whose status, prospects and salaries are at the lower end of the scale, as near as possible to the status of the foreign workers. The predictions are conceptually similar to those outlined above: that as the lack of support was due to the need for the preservation of differentials from the "inferior" groups of foreign workers, this would show itself in some degree of preference for their preservation, even at some cost to an improvement of scales and prospects common to both groups which would obliterate the differentials. In practical terms, it might perhaps be possible to find a multi-racial or multi-national industrial setting of this kind in which the issue is dormant at present and where therefore there might not be too much resistance to the kind of research outlined here. But this is probably a forlorn hope, since a "dormant" issue could become very much awake as a result of the activities of a few social psychologists let loose in a factory.

It is intended that the research envisaged in this proposal should, as far as possible, move back and forth between studies in natural social settings and experimental studies. The settings of social differentials just discussed and the investigation of the subjective balance that may exist between the improvement of a group's position in absolute terms as compared with such an improvement in relative terms can also be directly studied in the laboratory. We shall, however, in some of the studies go half-way towards "real" situations in using groups of subjects who identify themselves as members of a defined social category related to other such categories (e.g. students in technical colleges and colleges of education, pupils in various types of schools, etc.). They will be confronted with the feedback of presumed responses and performance from members of other social categories relevant to an intergroup comparison. All such "half-real" studies will be followed immediately by a complete debriefing of the subjects.

An extended experimental equivalent of the problem of social differentials vs. absolute levels of reward will be designed to explore comparatively the effects on intergroup attitudes and behaviour of relative deprivation vs. frustration induced by non-fulfillment of expectations about the absolute level of rewards. The studies will consist of several phases: (i) exploration of
the existing intergroup attitudes through interviews and rating scales; (ii) creation of expectations about a competitive level of reward for average performance on a subsequent task; this will be done through feedback about a preliminary "predictor" test; (iii) performance of the task (each subject working separately) which will be of some relevance and specific interest to the group, such as, for example, the reproduction from memory of a technical drawing for students from technical colleges; (iv) announcement of the level of performance (and reward) in relation to those of the comparison group; (v) dependent variables: individual evaluation by each subject of products made individually by members of his own and the other group and invitation to the subjects to present (each of them separately) what they consider would have been justified modifications to the distribution of rewards that has been decided upon by the experimenters on the basis of the experimenters' rating of performance on the task; (vi) de-briefing of the subjects.

The information provided to the subjects about the "predictor" test (expectations) and about the level of performance on the actual task (determining the group's comparative position on the reward scale) will be so arranged that: (a) the initial expected relationship for any group will be either equal or superior or inferior to the comparison group; (b) the absolute level of reward will be equal, superior or inferior to expectations; (c) the comparative level of reward will be the same as the expectation or different from it in an upwards or downwards direction. A full design would therefore require a very large number of experimental groups. It is our intention to select, after some pilot studies, those which will be the most meaningful to the subjects and for which clear-cut predictions about the dependent variables can be made on the basis of the present theoretical argument. The main purpose of the studies, which will determine the selection of the experimental groups jointly with the above criteria, is to compare the effects on intergroup behaviour and attitudes of frustration induced through a non-fulfillment of expectations about the absolute level of reward, the comparative level being held constant, with the parallel effects of a non-fulfillment of expectations about the comparative level of reward, the absolute level being held constant.
(c) Intergroup similarity and psychological distinctiveness.

The comparative social identity function of differentials, discussed in the previous sub-section, is closely related to the effects on intergroup behaviour of the degree of similarity or dissimilarity between social groups which are consensually placed on a scale as "superior" or "inferior" in relation to some criteria. The argument in this proposal leads to the general prediction that groups should strive more markedly to achieve distinctiveness from other groups which are relatively nearer to them on that scale than from groups which are clearly and definitely far away on the scale. In "real" social situations this is very often not the case for several reasons: for example, an inferior group, however clearly inferior, may present (and often does) more of a powerful threat to the superior group than other inferior groups which are nearer to it on the social scale; or, groups which are relatively near to one another may create (and often do) coalitions to increase or decrease the distance between them and a group which is further away on the scale and presents a common threat. In doing this, they sometimes merge and become one larger group in opposition to those who are distinctly different in one direction or another.

It remains true, however, that the logic of the argument presented in the previous sections leads to the prediction that, all else being constant, small differences which are related to valued distinctiveness should lead to more strenuous efforts to preserve and/or increase distinctiveness than should larger differences. For reasons just stated, the studies to test this prediction should be conducted experimentally in such a way that: (i) coalitions and merging of groups are not possible; and (ii) the groups should not present greater or less threats of various kinds to each other related to their differing distances on the scale, apart from the sole threat to comparative identity existing as a function of the degree of distance.

We intend to use three conditions of distance each involving three experimental groups according to the following schema:
The phases of the experiments will be as follows: (i) performance of a task; (ii) prearranged feedback of the performance as a result of which the subjects in each of the groups will perceive the relationship between the three groups as being one of the nine structures which are possible in the above arrangement; (iii) dependent variables: the payment matrices used in the Tajfel et al. and other experiments will be used again, the subjects being requested to distribute rewards between two other people each of whom will be from one of the other two groups. For purposes of additional experimental control, distributions of reward will also be made to two others in the following combinations: (a) both from the subject's own group; (b) and (c): one from the subject's own group and one from one of the other groups; (iv) de-briefing of the subjects.

(c) Superordinate goals and group identity.

A further line of research relating to the comparisons between the effects of various kinds of "objective" group interests and the need to achieve group distinctiveness has to do with the well-known results of Sherif's studies (e.g. 1966). Sherif found that the only condition which led to the disappearance of intergroup conflict was the setting to both groups of common "superordinate" goals. It seems therefore that under certain conditions the relationship between the interests of the two groups determines fully the nature of their attitudinal relationship and that in some of these conditions the need for the establishment or the preservation of group's identity disappears. It is however possible that this conclusion from Sherif's results is not as general as it appears. Sherif's groups were created and fully defined as groups on the basis of the criteria of their competitive interests. Starting from this competition, they created ingroup rituals and symbols and were led to display hostile attitudes towards the outgroup. The disappearance of the competition and its substitution by an over-riding common interest meant basically not that the two groups found
themselves in a new relationship to one another in which there was no need to preserve some form of group distinctiveness but rather that they merged into one group. This is undoubtedly a sequence of events which is a valid reflection of what frequently happens in intergroup situations. It poses however, a practical and a theoretical problem.

The ability of Sherif's two groups to merge into one places firmly his experimental situation in the quadrants A or C of the two-by-two schema discussed in the previous section of this proposal: the quadrants in which the individual members of a group can leave their own group without difficulty and "pass" into another. In this particular case this is true of both the competing groups as they are able to shed their identity and merge into one. As already stated, once the competition of interests disappeared, there were no other differences between the groups. On the contrary, in addition to the new superordinate goals, there had been the previous individual friendships which criss-crossed the subsequent division into groups, the common induction into the holiday camp, the rich variety of face-to-face contacts, etc. The research question which arises is therefore as follows: would superordinate goals be a sufficiently strong motive to abandon group identity and the search for the preservation of group distinctiveness in situations in which the definition of a group is independent of, and transcends, a particular sequence of inter-group competition? The argument presented earlier in this proposal points to the possibility that this might not be the case. On the other hand, this is one of the sociopsychological problems for which it would be no less than foolish to attempt an a priori universal generalization. The outcome of the interaction between the merging of goals and the preservation of group identity must depend upon the relative importance of the goals to be attained and the relative strength of the ingroup identification.

The problem is nevertheless an important one and in view of the absence of relevant research, some exploratory studies of it should be attempted. It appears to me that in view of Sherif's results, a good research strategy would be to confront relatively weak ingroup identity with relatively strong superordinate goals common to both groups, since results showing some predicted effects of the preservation of identity would give some plausibility
to a fortiori arguments about numerous "real" situations in which this kind of relationship is more balanced or even reversed. The methodological requirements of the research are as follows: (i) two groups having a well-defined identity, in the sense of differentiation from each other, which is independent of their competitive or cooperative relationship in the experiments; (ii) competition between the groups in which, as a function of the level of performance, one or the other group receives a material reward; (iii) first set of dependent variables, such as various kinds of relevant evaluations of the ingroup and the outgroup; (iv) a new task in which a common material reward, much larger than the previous competitive reward, is made dependent upon the cooperation of both groups in the successful performance of a task; (v) a second set of dependent variables consisting of intergroup evaluations (on dimensions different from, but equivalent to, the first set of evaluations).

If in these conditions attempts to preserve group distinctiveness are found to disappear in the second set of dependent variables, research will be conducted in conditions of more powerful ingroup identity such as, for example, fans of various football teams or pupils from various kinds of educational establishments. One interesting possibility would also be to employ groups from various national, ethnic or racial groups if this proves feasible.

(e) The ingroup and intergroup effects of marginal group identity.
The need for a group to provide its members with positive social identity in comparison with other groups is conspicuously not fulfilled in the case of marginal groups, which were discussed in the first section of this proposal. We shall define marginal groups for the present purpose as those composed of individuals who are, for some reason common to all of them, not acknowledged as having a definite place and function in the system of which they are a part and who are consequently victims of some degree of contempt from others and sometimes also from themselves. The theoretical importance of such groups for the present proposal is that they should, on the basis of the argument put forward here, present two characteristics: always assuming the difficulty of "passing" or of merging with another group, they should find it imperative to create new distinctive identity characteristics acceptable to themselves and, if possible, to others; (ii) much of their behaviour should be addressed at
the creation and social acceptance of such attributes independently of the "objectively" competitive value of these attributes in the attainment of various kinds of concrete advantages. It should be possible to find such groups in real social settings and to study, through interviews, questionnaires, observation and rating scales, these particular aspects of their development. One example is provided: by groups of homosexuals who have been able to find easier conditions for the development of common social identity since the recent introduction of a more liberal legislation.

Another example in the recent past was the existence in Oxford (also in Cambridge) of a large category of teaching members of the University (at one time nearly one-third of the total) who were referred to, perhaps significantly from the perspective adopted here, as "non-fellows". These were people appointed to university posts who, however, for various reasons have not been elected to college fellowships, and therefore found themselves outside many of the more intimate patterns of social life, lines of communication and decision-making in the university. An informal organization of "non-fellows" was set up, and the problem was finally settled, in part and after very long negotiations, by the establishment of several new colleges of which the non-fellows became fellows. Four aspects of the new situation thus created are interesting from the present point of view: (i) some of the new colleges attempted to acquire many of the characteristics, including the rituals, of the older ones; (ii) some strove hard to develop a different but equal identity in stressing their corporate differences from the older colleges; (iii) in practice, most of them finally adopted a judicious mixture of (i) and (ii); (iv) there is little doubt that to some fellows of the older colleges the new ones have never become entirely acceptable as "real" colleges. This situation is still to some extent alive, and there are now new waves of non-fellows for whom it is difficult to find a place even in the over-crowded new colleges. The four aspects of the situation just mentioned and the problems still remaining can be subjected to a field study (including field observations of the rituals etc.,) based on contacts with various categories of people involved now or in the past, as long as one avoids the more formal trappings of questionnaires and rating scales.
Studies of this kind can be provided with adequate equivalents in the laboratory if we can find groups of subjects who can be exposed repeatedly (four to six times, perhaps) to certain experimental procedures. Two possibilities are envisaged at present: repeated visits by the experimenters to the same class in a school; or the use of a holiday camp for young people. The experimental procedures would be roughly as follows: (i) division of the total group into three sub-groups, of which two would be given clear-cut and distinct definitions on certain criteria and would engage in clearly different and non-competitive group tasks; the third group, although present and referred to as a group (this is important in view of the result of Billig (1972) about the importance of the term "group" even when based on random criteria of assignment to membership), would be "left out" and asked to pass the time as best they can; (ii) at repeated sessions, the two non-marginal groups would be encouraged to create and develop a variety of distinctive symbols of their groups (cf. the discussion about the "ideologizing" of group characteristics, p.14 of this proposal); (iii) dependent variables: it is predicted that the marginal subjects will develop a common group identity distinct from the other two, in creating both a common task and common symbols rather than engage in individual pursuits during the sessions. In addition, they will seek a legitimization of their group identity (task and distinctive symbols) from the experimenters and from members of the other two groups.

The theoretical importance to us of this kind of design is twofold: first, it would provide a setting to validate the general hypotheses about behavioural compensation for inadequate or ill-defined social identity; and second, it would provide an additional opportunity for testing one of the major hypotheses of this proposal: that a relatively secure social identity creates less marked ingroup and outgroup effects of various kinds than an insecure and inadequate social identity. The second hypotheses will be tested through comparing the ingroup and outgroup evaluations and symbols produced by the two "secure" groups as related to those produced by the marginal group.

(f) Group inferiority, group creativity and intergroup behaviour.

The marginal groups discussed above can be seen as a special case of inadequate social identity and its effects. The problems of positive distinctiveness arise in a similar manner in the more general case of groups consensually
regarded as inferior. Groups of this kind were discussed at length in the first two sections of this proposal; the second section included a set of predictions concerning the effects on both the inferior and superior groups of the attempts by the inferior ones to endow their attributes with positively valued distinctiveness. These attempts were conceived as falling into three categories: (i) re-evaluation of "old" distinctive attributes previously considered as inferior; (ii) acquisition of positively valued attributes previously considered as inhering only in the superior group; and (iii) creation of positively valued new distinctive attributes. The first of these implies basically a change in the evaluation of attributes; the second, a change in the evaluation of the group on certain attributes; and the third, the creation of evaluations of new attributes. The two main problems confronting the inferior group in all three cases were seen as: acceptance by the ingroup of the new evaluations, and their acceptance by the outgroup. It was hypothesized that a failure of the latter is a flashpoint for intense intergroup tension and hostility.

As these are problems of considerable scope and complexity, a choice between them must be made in a limited research project on grounds of theoretical and practical importance and of feasibility. After some consideration of various alternatives, the choice suggested here is the investigation of the third category of problems, i.e. the creation by an inferior group of positively valued new distinctive attributes. There are several reasons for this choice. One is that, if the results conform to predictions, they could be theoretically generalized to the first category above; the second, that this kind of research would involve at the same time research into processes of group creativity and innovation which present their own inherent interest; the third is the considerable difficulty of constructing experimentally cases which would be genuinely equivalent to categories (i) and (ii) above; and the fourth that research by Lemaine, to which reference was made earlier (Lemaine, 1966; Lemaine & Kastersztein, 1971-2) already provides some promising leads for its modification and extension in directions determined by the theoretical background of this proposal.

In Lemaine's research, one of two groups was offered inferior resources; this prevented it from having an equal chance in the competition. Therefore its "creativity" (which consisted of modifying and enlarging the definition of
the task) and its efforts to legitimize this change of definition may have been due to their desire to improve their chances of winning the competition or to establish their positive distinctiveness, or most probably to the interaction of both these factors. As our aim is to establish the autonomous functioning of the latter variable, a clear distinction must be made between the two. This implies that the inferior group would have to display modes of creativity which (i) can be used as a means of positive comparison with the superior group; and (ii) are non-instrumental with regard to the outcome of other competitive interests.

The difficulty of translating this kind of problem into experimental terms is that in "real life" the inferior group's search for new forms of comparison and the superior group's resistance to them are based in both cases on the groups' long social history which provides the conditions for a slow development of new and alternative modes of social action and of perception of the social world. The examples given in the previous section concerned the emerging reinterpretation and creation of group attributes by the American blacks and more generally, in the young or reviving versions of nationalism. In view, however, of the ambiguity of interpretation of what happens in these "real cases", experimental studies of parallel phenomena would present clear advantages. The general design briefly outlined below is no more than a tentative blueprint for pilot studies from which, perhaps, a firmer structure will emerge later.

The first stage of the experimental studies would consist of inducing two groups to compete in a series of tasks in order to obtain a reward, with one of the groups showing (through prearranged feedback from the experimenters) a clear and consistent superiority on all of the tasks. After the distribution of "real" rewards, the groups will be informed that the same tasks will serve for further studies with a number of other groups—and that, although it would now be unfair to revise in any way the distribution of rewards which has already been made, the experimenters are not entirely happy about the nature of the tasks and the assessment criteria which they had used. They would like to improve the tasks and the criteria by using opinions, views and advice from the present subjects. The dependent variables will then consist of:
(i) evaluation by both groups of their own and the other's products; (ii) specification of criteria which they used in these evaluations; (iii) specification of suggestions for the modifications of the tasks; (iv) evaluation by both groups of their own and the other group's performance in (ii) and (iii) above; (v) request for suggestions how to distribute to the ingroup and the outgroup a fixed amount of reward for their new work which still happens to remain at the experimenters' disposal after the first distribution of rewards. Both groups will be provided with information about (iv) - i.e. about their evaluations of each other's performance in the second series of tasks - before they make their decisions about the distribution of the remaining amount of reward.

This is a cumbersome design and it is hoped that it will be simplified and more clearly structured after the initial pilot studies. The main predictions concern the inferior group's relatively greater inventiveness in (ii) and (iii); and the effects on the inferior group's differential distribution of the second set of rewards of the acceptance or rejection in (iv) by the superior group of the inferior group's suggestions. The subjects will be debriefed as soon as the experiment is over.

(g) Linguistic correlates of intergroup discrimination.¹

Research has shown that speech can be used as a strategy for interpersonal accommodation. Naturally, the type of accommodation a speaker produces depends on the perceived salient characteristics of his listener, such as social status (Slobin, et al., 1968), sex (Beene et al., 1956), age (Granowskey & Krossner, 1970) and presumed knowledge of the conversational topic (Ratner and Rice, 1963). However, accommodation by speech can take on a subtler, and sometimes perhaps a more unconscious form in cases where a speaker tends to adopt or model the speech patterns of the person to whom he is talking - a phenomenon termed "response matching" by Argyle (1969). This phenomenon

¹ This sub-section is based on a more extensive draft prepared by Dr. Howard Giles after initial discussions between Dr. Giles, Mr. Kleiven (University of Bergen) and the author of the proposal.
has been demonstrated in a few studies on at least one member of a dyad in relation to the other on a number of linguistic levels. These levels include speech rate (Webb, 1969), vocal intensity (Black, 1949), regional accent (Giles, 1972), speech durations (Matarazzo et al., 1968) and speech silences (Jaffe and Feldstein, 1970). Other studies (Lennard & Bernstein, 1960; Welkowitz & Feldstein, 1970) have shown that speech accommodation between members of a dyad can often be a mutual process increasing each time the participants interact. Not all examples of response matching can be understood within the accommodation framework and hence it seems important to consider a distinction made by Giles (1971) between 'positive' and 'negative' response matching. The studies cited so far have all been examples of the former and may be explained in terms of the accommodation model proposed. Negative response matching on the other hand, was the term introduced to denote certain types of modelling which appear more plausibly explainable within a fabric of social retaliation. Such behaviour may be exemplified in situations where one person reciprocates the other's use of interruptions (Argyle & Kendon, 1967) and verbal aggression (Mosher et al., 1968). The work undertaken on accommodation by speech appears largely to have concentrated on adjustments between members of the same ethnic group. Therefore, the modifications documented thus far have been concerned with convergent behaviour within a single linguistic code. In other words, little work apart from that of Giles, Taylor & Bourhis (1972) on bilingual accommodation between English- and French-Canadians, has been conducted into the process whereby members of different ethnolinguistic groups attempt to adjust to each other.

Speech convergence, however, whether symmetrical or asymmetrical within a dyadic situation, may only be one aspect of a much wider phenomenon of speech change induced at one linguistic level of the sender's repertoire because of the receiver's performance on this same level. It has been proposed by Giles (1971) and supported by social anthropological evidence in a review by Giles & Powesland (In prep.) that in certain social interactions there may exist (in direct contrast to the need for integration) dissociative motivational tendencies in one or both dyadic members to modify their speech patterns away from the other - termed speech divergence. Similarly, if the sender's and
receiver's orientations are mutual then they may be 'symmetrical' in their efforts towards progressive divergence. Thus, a sender might attempt to dissociate himself from any identification with the receiver or, more broadly, from the group which the individual represents. Indeed, this phenomenon may be looked upon in terms of this proposal as expressing the individual's affirmation of his group's psychological distinctiveness. Speech convergence is a strategy of conformity in terms of identification with the speech patterns of an individual internal to the social situation, whereas speech divergence may be regarded as a conformity process towards the linguistic norms of some reference group external to the immediate situation. Unfortunately, the study of speech change, let alone speech convergence, has been so barren that speech divergence has not even been empirically documented, and therefore for the moment, has to be left at the level of supposition.

What then are the likely speech modifications or adjustments (if any) that a person from one linguistic community will make when interacting with a representative from another linguistic group?

**Hypothesis I.** When two dialect groups are involved, between-group cooperative tasks will be characterized by convergent speech patterns related to their categorization, i.e. accent convergence. If this hypothesis were to be supported empirically, it could be suggested in terms of our previous discussion that group members in this situation may be searching for a redefinition of their identity which is distinct from their ingroup. Nevertheless, it is worth pointing out that accent convergence may not in fact characterize all intergroup cooperative situations. Indeed, divergence may sometimes be apparent in that people may feel a need to maintain (perhaps by exaggerated emphasis) their group membership through language for the very reason that outgroup discrimination has diminished. Doise found that in intergroup competitive situations discrimination was not reduced subsequent to interaction, and sometimes indeed was increased.

**Hypothesis II.** When two dialect groups are involved, between-group competitive tasks will be characterized by divergent speech patterns related to their categorization, i.e. accent divergence. However, since speech divergence has never been empirically demonstrated, it may be more cautious
to consider modifying hypothesis II so that between-group competition may not induce accent convergence but may instead just allow the subject to adopt his regular speech patterns (i.e. his idiolect).

The project is being proposed for study in Britain (more specifically in South Wales), but it will also be conducted in cooperation with colleagues in Norway (Jo Kleiven, University of Bergen) and Switzerland (Willém Doise, University of Geneva) in order that the phenomena can be cross-nationally verified and the differences noted and investigated further. Pilot work already undertaken in Wales and Norway suggests that several interesting cross-cultural differences may emerge in the nature of subjects' intergroup discriminations. For instance, it has been found that subjects in Wales have shown a disposition to think others of their own group will evaluate the outgroup more favourably than they do themselves. Not so in Norway where a reverse trend appears evident on many objective scales. Such differences that may eventually emerge between the national situations will be investigated thoroughly as cooperation between the European workers is envisaged.

This part of the project is not only important as an extension of the research plans previously described, but may also provide means of linking two previously independent research areas — intergroup behaviour and sociolinguistics. Moreover, the research may be of considerable importance to socio-linguistics in its own right since no attempt to demonstrate the existence of speech divergence has yet been attempted. In addition, the sociolinguistic models of accommodation (Giles et al., 1972) and accent mobility (Giles, 1972) may be elaborated in the light of new speech data. Furthermore, not only is it hoped to show that regional accent and other linguistic variables can be viewed as static reflections of intergroup relations (a dependent variable), but that speech in addition can be used as a more dynamic strategy to alter the nature of the relationship itself (an independent variable). However, such possibilities can only be explored in the analyses of extensive pilot research.

It is proposed that the research be conducted in South Wales using 16 year old boys from two accent communities there.

(a) One accent community (loosely-termed the 'Welsh' group) would be represented by bilingual (Welsh-speaking) boys whose English is markedly Welsh-coloured; these boys would be attending a bilingual school where
classes were taught in Welsh.

(b) The other group (loosely-termed the "English" group) would consist of boys, born in Wales, from Cardiff and whose only tongue is English. Their English would, unlike the Welsh group, contain little, if any, trace of their Welsh heritage in their pronunciation or intonation. (Cardiff, particularly amongst the Welsh, is regarded as an extremely anglicized city, so much so that a real dispute arose about its suitability to be the capital of the Principality).

A categorization of the boys into these two groups would be meaningful and salient to them as they represent different poles of two value continua—Welsh identification and social prestige. For example: Welsh group because of their language habits: Pride in cultural identification through language, but low prestige (cf. Giles, 1970) value of their regional English. English group because of their language habits: 'Shame" at having no cultural identification through language, but high prestige value of the non-Welsh accented-English.

All the tasks undertaken by the subjects, whether solely or in dyads, require them finding their way (and verbalizing this) through a map of a geographical area relevant to the two language groups; place names on the map will tend to make salient the language group memberships.

The subjects, individually, will be handed a map of Wales with a route drawn on it. They will be told to describe this route (without using road numbers) into a tape recorder, as later they will be given a blank map and told to redraw the route using their own tape-recorded message. The experimenter will leave the room and the subject will be completely alone to record a message for his own use. Actually, there will be no use made of this recording later by the subject. This procedure is thought necessary so that the subjects will produce spontaneously their usual speech patterns. These patterns can then be compared to their speech in intra- and intergroup situations that they will experience in the remaining phases.

Two slightly different experimental tasks will be used: one cooperative and one competitive. All the verbal interactions will be tape-recorded and used in arriving at the dependent measures.
Subjects from the two accent groups will be used and categorizations (at least in the preliminary study) will be made most explicit, even in terms of labelling them the English and Welsh groups and defining their attributes, socially, linguistically and culturally. The main design is thus a 2 x 2; same vs. different language group members in a cooperative vs. competitive situation. Each of the two 'same' group cells may be further subdivided since an equal number of these dyads would come from each of the two language groups. The subjects would only perform the cooperative or the competitive task with a member of their ingroup or outgroup. The design would also be balanced such that half the sample experienced the intra-group situation first whilst the other half experienced the intergroup situation first.

The scales will be selected through pilot studies bearing in mind which scales have been successfully used in earlier social psychology-language studies, and how these scales will apply to the three different countries. Rating scales of ingroup-outgroup similarity in terms of linguistic usage, and cultural identity will be adopted. Ratings of ingroup and outgroup in terms of competence, integrity and social attractiveness will also be included as will questions relating to how the groups will consider the task themselves. Control groups will be able to offer us information about how the groups perceive each other in a situation where they do not anticipate interaction. The experimental groups will be told to anticipate interaction. The control groups will also in questionnaire data be able to provide data on how they expect to behave in the situation, how they expect others to behave, and what they expect from their partners. The post-interaction questionnaires (i.e. from the experimental groups) will give data on the subjects' experiences of what they and their partners actually did do in the situation, especially with regard to convergence/divergence.

The method proposed to quantify such accent shifts will be the 'gestalt-comparison' analysis adopted by Giles (1971; 1972). This technique involves the selection of short samples of subjects' speech in the two situations (e.g. phase 1 and an intergroup condition) and playing them successively to a large group of listeners. These listeners are required to state: (1) whether any shift occurred between subject's recorded samples, and (2) the direction of the
shift (e.g. more Welsh or more English in the second version), and (3) to rate on a continuous 10 cm. line the magnitude of any shift they perceived. This measure is admittedly very global but for the purposes of an intergroup relations study it does not seem important to isolate particular phonological variables in people's speech and determine which particular isolated sounds change in a given situation. It seems important to determine whether untrained and naive listeners can detect a change in a person's speech and not whether some sophisticated acoustic instrument or trained linguist can detect minimal changes that may be unperceived by the ordinary ear. The drawback to the global analysis is the consumption of listeners' time. For instance, there may be as many as eight speech comparisons to be rated for each of the 80 subjects. It may in this case be more economical to provide two or three judges with the data at different times and check their rating reliability.

IV. Conclusion

Some of the research plans outlined above are presented in more detail than others; some will be more feasible, for administrative and social reasons, than others. We are also aware of the fact that a small research team would not be able to implement all these plans in a period of three years. For all these reasons, we have no doubt that a selection of studies to be conducted will have to be made in the early stages of our work. This selection will be made both on grounds of feasibility determined by pilot studies and other considerations, and on the basis of assessment of the relative theoretical and practical importance of the issues involved. We do not wish, however, at this point of time to plan beyond a period of three years. The main reason for this is our conviction that, after a first three-year phase of work, we shall be in a very much better position to present plans for further research based on the selection and results of the studies conducted during this initial phase.

It is, however, important to add that our research resources will not be limited to a small team working in Bristol. The work on the psycholinguistic correlates of discrimination (sub-section (g), section III) will be conducted in Cardiff under the direction of Dr. Giles with cooperation in Bergen and
Geneva (Mr. Kleiven and Professor Doise). In addition, Professor Moscovici of the École Pratique des Hautes Études in Paris intends to cooperate actively and generally in the research, and facilities and research assistance will be available at his laboratory at the Maison des Sciences de l'Homme. The same is true of Professor Doise in Geneva who has already conducted in the past some studies related to the previous work in Bristol. J.P. van de Geer, Professor of Data Theory at the University of Leiden has also already cooperated with the author on the analysis of data from a small related project in Leiden; he is willing to be consulted about further problems of statistical analysis, and also to use for us some of the computer facilities at his disposal. None of this cooperation will require additional funds from the S.S.R.C. with the exception of funds that are requested in the relevant section of the proposal for periodic short conferences of all those who will be directly involved in the research. There is a good chance that some of the conferences will also be supported by the Maison des Sciences de l'Homme in Paris which will take care of the subsistence costs and some of the travel costs of the participants.
Items marked * report on work which derives from, or is directly related to, the earlier Bristol experiments described in the first section of the text.


References


### Table 3

Attraction For "B.G.W." For Varying Degrees Of Similarity On Items of Heterogeneous Importance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Similarity on items of low importance</th>
<th>Similarity on items of high importance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100%</td>
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<td>50%</td>
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